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This thesis focuses on the lack of legal certainty with regard to the exercise 
of planning law mandates of the respective spheres of government in South 
Africa. An attempt is made to uncover the reasons for the lack of legal 
certainty by looking at the pre-1994 planning regime and the regulatory 
framework inherited by the new dispensation. 
2 
Thereafter, the subsequent Constitutional and legislative developments are 
outlined and areas of confusion are identified. Reasons are given for why co-
operative governance has failed to allay such confusion. Lastly, the 
subsequent attempts by the judiciary and the legislature are analysed to see 
whether they have successfully provided for the legal certainty needed. 
- 3 
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1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
The advent of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the 
Constitution) sparked the birth of a new era in and a unified commitment to 
change. Yet the planning law1 regime, which was in desperate need of 
change, received little attention. The reason behind the regime being so 
recalcitrant to change cannot be attributed to a single factor.2 
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Nevertheless, the overriding factor is certainly fragmentation, which 
permeates through the entire planning law regime. 3 The reason for such 
fragmentation includes the fact that a fragmented and cumbersome planning 
law regime was inherited from the apartheid government.4 
Numerous attempts have been made at reworking the land-use planning law 
regime to alleviate this fragmentation, albeit unsuccessfully. However, all 
spheres of government are now in agreement that failure is no longer an 
option. What brought about this unanimity was the Constitutional Court 
declaring chapters V and VI of the Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995 
(DFA) unconstitutional.5 The DFA was promulgated to serve as a quick fix to 
1 "The designation 'planning law' has been sanctioned by the Constitutional Court; it is the most uncomplicated term to use; it derives from 
English law, which is part of South Africa's planning heritage; and it is wide enough to accommodate the strong, ever-increasing social 
element which manifests itself in the principles and purposes of planning law, which is to improve the quality of life of those affected by 
planning." (VanWyk J Planning Law 2 ed (2012) Juta Cape Town 14). 
1 For a detailed discussion on the windows of opportunity for change within the land use planning regime and an evaluation of why success 
was so difficult to attain see Berrisford S "Unravelling Apartheid Spatial Planning Legislation in South Africa: A Case Study" 2011 (22:3) 
Urban Forum 247-263. 
J The Court has held that "the statutory framework regulating town planning and building regulations in its present form is fragmented and 
cumbersome in the extreme ... It requires a vast bureaucratic machine to administer all these provisions ... The system also frequently ... 
gives rise to conflicting and inconsistent decisions taken by different functionaries, officials and organs at different levels [sic] of local and 
provincial government. It would be of great assistance to everyone involved in the process ... if the administrative machinery required to 
regulate these matters could be consolidated, simplified and streamlined." (Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association and Others v 
The Minister of Planning, Culture and Administration (Western Cape) and Others 2001 4 SA 301 (CPO)). 
4 The inheritance of a fragmented planning law regime will be showcased in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
5 Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal and Others 2010 (6) SA 182 (CC). 
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the major problem in South Africa, namely the urgent need for development.6 
Accordingly, with essential chapters of the DFA being declared 
unconstitutional the raw fragmentation in the planning regime was revealed 
for all to see. The fragmentation between the respective spheres of 
government over planning mandates was showcased. Due to the inability, 
or unwillingness, to resolve these land-use planning mandate conflicts, 
various land-use planning authorities looked to the courts for recourse This 
resulted in a plethora of fresh jurisprudence.7 Moreover, this occasioned the 
legislature being charged with the duty to provide urgent remedy to the 
situation. The proposed remedy is the enactment of a national planning 
framework, which has come in the form of the Spatial Planning and Land Use 
Management Act 16 of 2013 (SPLUMA). 
Planning law is a multidisciplinary area of the law and often leans quite 
heavily on other disciplines such as environmentallaw.8 It is therefore also 
an important field of law when it comes to the sustainable development of 
any country. This statement becomes logical when you realise that all 
development impacts upon land and therefore through effective land-use, 
land-use management and land-use planning, government can ensure that 
6 The DFA will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 4. 
1 These include, grouped by case and note by date, the following: Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 
2008 4 SA 572 (W); Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal and Others 2010 (2) SA 554 (SCA); 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal and Others 2010 (6) SA 182 (CC); Swart/and Municipality v Louw 
2010 5 SA 314 (WCC); City of Cape Town v Maccsand {Ply) Ltd 2010 6 SA 63 (WCC); Maccsand (Pty) Ltd and Another v City of Cape Town 
and Others 2011 6 SA 633 (SCA); Maccsand (Pty) Ltd and Another v City of Cape Town and Others 2012 103/11 SA 7 (CC); Lagoon Bay 
Lifestyle Estate (Ply) Ltd v The Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning of the Western Cape and 
Others 2011 4 All SA 270 (WCC); Lagoon bay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd v The Minister for Local Government, Environmental Affairs and 
Development Planning of the Western Cape and Others 2013 13 SA 320112 (SCA); The Minister for Local Government, Environmental Affairs 
and Development Planning of the Western Cape v Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 39 SA 41/13 (CC); Shelfplett 
47(Pty) Ltd v MEG for Environmental Affairs and Development Planning and Another2012 3 SA 441 (WCC); Clairison's CC v the MEG for 
Local Government Environmental Affairs and Development Planning and Bitou Municipality 2012 3 SA 128 (WCC); Mtunzini Conservancy v 
Tronox KZN Sands (Ply) Ltd and Another 10629/2012 201310629 SA 2012 (KZDHC); The Macassar Land Claims Committee v Maccsand 
CC and Others 2013 37 (LCC); RA LeSueur veThekwini Municipality2013 JDR 0178 (KZP); and Habitat Council and Another v Provincial 
Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning in the Western Cape and Others; City of Cape Town v 
Provincial Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning in the Western Cape and Others (6227/2013; 
23061/2009) 2013 ZAWCHC 112; 2013 (6) SA 113 (WCC). 
8 VanWyk Planning Law 10. 
all development is sustainable. Land-use, land-use management and land-
use planning are in fact the three subcomponents of planning law and by 
expanding upon each the link between planning law and sustainability 
becomes even more lucid. Land use can best be described as "referring to 
the different activities (for example commercial or residential) which owners 
and occupiers of land conduct on their individual plots, as well as the 
densities (for example, height, coverage) appropriate to those plots."9 Land-
use management on the other hand refers to "government activity which 
seeks to influence or control change in the ways in which individuals use 
their land in including maximising benefits and minimising negative 
impacts". 10 Lastly, planning can be summed up as "the area of law which 
provides for the creation, implementation and management of a sustainable 
planning process to regulate land use, with the purpose of ensuring the 
health, safety and welfare of society as a whole and taking into account 
environmental factors" .11 
Accordingly, the planning law ethos aligns perfectly with the three pillars of 
sustainability, namely: economic development; societal improvement; and 
protection of the environment. 12 The concept of sustainable development 
has been a slippery one to define, albeit the many attempts to do so.13 
Nevertheless, the definite link between sustainable development and 
planning cannot be denied. An effective planning regime therefore can be 
viewed as instrumental to achieving sustainable development throughout 
South Africa. 14 
9 Van Wyk Planning Law 5. 
10 Van Wyk Planning Law 5. 
11 VanWyk Planning Law 5. 
12 The link between the environment and development was established at the World Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 
Sweden (1972). 
13 For example see the Brundtland Report (1987); the Rio Deceleration (1992) and the Johannesburg Declaration (2002). 
14 For a more detailed discussion of the concept of sustainable development see FERIS, LA "The role of good environmental governance in 




In light of the above, the benefits of having a coherent, integrated and holistic 
planning regime are clear. Unfortunately, the existence of a fragmented 
planning law regime in South Africa has negatively impacted upon many 
areas, for example: 15 
(a) Economically: it impedes investment in land development and fails to 
establish sufficient certainty in the land market; 
(b) Spatially: it fails to address the segregated and unequal spatial patterns 
inherited from apartheid; and 
(c) Environmentally: it does not balance the country's socio-economic needs 
with those of environmental conservation. 
In practice the inheritance of a fragmented land-use planning regime 
rendered many challenges to government when faced with "rapid and 
unprecedented urbanisation"16 which was sparked by the collapse of the 
apartheid regime. The DFA was promulgated, as mentioned above, as a 
response to this but it was only meant to be a temporary fix. 
Nevertheless, despite the difficulties mentioned above, land-use planning in 
South Africa did develop in line with international trends as it was recognised 
that planning may impact upon more than one province or municipality. 
Accordingly, it was acknowledged that the planning regime, which in South 
Africa traditionally focussed on urban centres, has a key role to play 
throughout contemporary South Africa. Therefore all three spheres of 
government are involved in the planning process in their respective 
capacities. 17 
Naturally, because all spheres of government are role players in the planning 
regime it is of paramount importance that the planning mandates of each 
15 S 38 of the Spatial Planning; Land Use Management Biii14B of 2012. 
1s Van Wyk Planning Law 457; Pienaar 2002 SAPL 343. 
17 This will become evident through the unpacking of Schedule 4 and 5 of the Constitution in Chapter 3 below. 
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sphere are clearly understood by all stakeholders. The Constitution sets out 
the respective planning mandates in Schedules 4 and 5. Nevertheless, as 
will be depicted in this thesis, the mandates are by no means clear-cut, which 
does not provide for legal certainty. 
The lack of legal certainty in this regard has been so problematic that it has 
rendered the many co-operative governance mechanisms ineffective. 18 
Without these co-operative governance mechanisms being utilized by the 
spheres of government and their line departments it does not come as a 
surprise that a plethora of matters have gone to court. 
The aim of this thesis is to provide insight into the fragmented nature and the 
associated challenges of the South African planning regime with particular 
focus on the planning mandates of the respective spheres of government. 
The uncertainties regarding these mandates will be pin-pointed and 
unpacked. 
After establishing the above foundation, the research question underlying this 
thesis will be answered, namely: has the latest intervention by both the 
judiciary and the legislature potentially provided for legal certainty on the 
land-use planning mandates of the respective spheres of government? 
This structure of this thesis will be as follows. Chapter 2 seeks to outline the 
planning regime which existed prior to 1994. Particular emphasis will be 
placed on the governance aspects of this regime, namely which laws were 
administered by which authorities. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate 
the governance challenges which existed in this era and which were 
subsequently inherited by the post-1994 era. 
18 See Chapter 4 below for a discussion on the challenges and failings of co-operative governance. 
10 
Chapter 3 focuses on the post-1994 constitutional era and its planning 
regulatory framework. This will involve a discussion on the competences of 
national, provincial and local government, as per the Constitution, to 
promulgate and administer planning laws. This will be achieved by 
unpacking Schedules 4 and 5 and other relevant provisions of the 
Constitution. This exercise will show that the Constitution has catered for the 
spheres of government to be "distinctive, interrelated, and interdependent". 
The two former concepts will be defined and the resulting overlaps and 
uncertainty will be identified. In addition, the regulatory framework within 
which planning authorities have to operate will also be discussed. This will 
outline the structure of the resultant planning laws and tools, with a view to 
illustrating the complexities, conflicts and overlaps inherent in the scheme. 
Moreover, this discussion will reflect on the associated complexities of having 
a host of old-order-legislation operating alongside post-1996 legislation and 
the consequential need for a national law to provide for a more holistic and 
integrated approach to planning. 
Chapter 4 will expand on the later principle mentioned above, namely 
"interdependent". Essentially this concept encapsulates co-operative 
governance amongst the various spheres of governance. Accordingly, this 
will entail a breakdown of what constitutes co-operative governance, the 
theoretical benefits thereof, and the statutory and non-statutory co-operative 
governance mechanisms. The aim of this chapter is to attempt to provide an 
explanation for why the numerous attempts at providing for co-operative 
governance have not succeeded in preventing matters dealing with planning 
mandates from going to court. 
Chapter 5 will focus on the latest jurisprudence and attempts by the courts to 
provide legal certainty on the planning mandates of the respective spheres of 
government. 
11 
A strong message that has been made by the judiciary is that the planning 
law regime is crying out for legislative intervention to provide for a more 
"uniform, effective, efficient and integrated regulatory framework". 19 In 
response the legislature promulgated the SPLUMA. The extent to which the 
SPLUMA clarifies the respective planning mandates of the three spheres of 
government is considered in chapter 6. 
After having set the foundation for understanding the dynamics of the 
planning law regime, the failings of co-operative governance and having 
expanded upon the latest attempts by the legislature and judiciary to provide 
legal certainty, chapter 7 will provide a conclusion on whether South Africa is 
moving towards promoting greater legal certainty in the country's planning 
regime. 
19 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal and Others 2012 2 SA 554 (SCA) para 33. 
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2 Chapter 2: Planning mandates in the pre-constitutional era 
The Chapter seeks to outline the planning regime which existed prior to 
1994. Particular emphasis will be placed on the planning mandates 
bestowed on government, more specifically, which laws were administered 
by which authorities. The purpose of this chapter is to not only provide an 
indication of the pre-1994 planning mandates but also to depict the system of 
governance that existed during this era. The post-1994 planning regime can 
therefore be juxtaposed against the above in order to showcase the changes 
that have been made in the constitutional era. 
2.1 Pre-1910 
Before South Africa became a union in 1910, the country consisted of the 
Cape Colony and Natal, which were governed by the British, and the two 
independent boer republics- Orange Free State and Transvaal. 
Each of these provinces promulgated legislation to govern planning in their 
respective jurisdictions. This began with the enactment of the Townships and 
Town Planning Ordinance20 in the Transvaal.21 The Transvaal Ordinance 
made provision for the preparation by municipalities of schemes controlling 
land use, density, building size and position.22 This Ordinance was followed 
by similar Ordinances in the Cape23 , Nata124 and the Orange Free State25. 
Each of these laws was modelled according to the British Town Planning Act 
of 1925 and therefore contained tools such as schemes.26 Moreover, there 
20 Ordinance11 of 1931. 
21 Kihato Integrating planning and environmental issues through the law in South Africa 25. 
22 Kihato Integrating planning and environmental issues through the law in South Africa 26. 
23 Township Ordinance 33 of 1934 which was later replaced by the by the Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1986. 
24 Private Townships and Town Planning Ordinance 10 of 1939 re-enacted by the Town Planning Ordinance 27 of 1949, and replaced by the 
Natal Land Use Planning and Development Act 9 of 2008. 
25 Township Ordinance 20 of 1947, replaced by the Townships Ordinance 9 of 1969, which is still applicable in the Free State. 
26 Kihato Integrating planning and environmental issues through the law in South Africa 26 (footnote omitted). 
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were similarities with the United States of America, especially in regard to the 
objects and purpose of spatial planning and the manner in which land use 
zoning law was conceptualised.27 
Developments at national level came in the form of the Slums Act of 1934 
which allowed greater powers to local authorities to destroy existing areas 
within their jurisdictions and re-plan them.28 
It was a positive step for the planning regime to have the above Provincial 
Planning Ordinances of the four provinces governing physical planning and 
land use regulation. However, the systems provided for by the provincial 
Ordinances did not apply to the "native reserves"/"controlled areas" created 
by the 1913 Land Act.29 These "native reserves"30 were even further 
extended under the Development Trust Land Act 18 of 1936 to include the 
so-called "released areas." 31 This lead to geographical fragmentation in the 
application of the planning laws in South Africa. 
2.2 A call for new national policy 
The Social and Economic Planning Council (SEPC) compiled a report which 
recommended the establishment of a national department of planning and for 
the adoption of regional planning and town planning initiatives. 32 
However, with growing hostility against the thought of central economic 
planning, national government hesitated to establish a national department of 
27 Kihato Integrating planning and environmental issues through the law in South Africa 26 (footnote omitted). 
2a Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 202. 
29 Todes, Sim & Sutherland 2009 "The Relationship between Planning and Environmental Management in South Africa: The Case of 
KwaZulu-Natal, Planning Practice & Research" (24:4) 411-433, 001417. 
30 "The Reserves were consolidated into nine 'independent' or 'self-governing' 'homelands' from the 1960s, while African Group Areas within 
the four provinces were managed under a different legal and administrative system ... " (Todes et al2009 001417). 
31 VanWyk Planning law43; the 1936 Land Act was bolstered by the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 which produced regulations and 
proclamations for the administrative control of land, land tenure in the general use of land that took place on landing areas demarcated by the 
Land Acts (Van Wyk Planning Law 43-44; also see generally Western Cape Provincial Government and Others: In re DVB Behuising (Pty) 
Ltd2001 (1)SA500(CC)). 
32 Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 205. 
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planning.33 Although national government did establish two new planning 
agencies, the Land Tenure Advisory Board's (L TAB's) initial powers were 
limited to Indian segregation. The Natural Resources Development Council 
(NRDC) was established in October 1947 as a regional planning body with 
potentially broad planning powers.34 The NDRC was the first regional 
planning body established in the country and was able to "co-ordinate the 
activities of other planning bodies, but also, in 'controlled areas' such as the 
three goldfields regions, no new urban development could take place without 
its approval."35 Therefore, the NDRC was in a position to initiate planning for 
the general allocation of land uses in those regions.36 
However, the limitation of the NDRCs's powers to only those controlled areas 
meant that "it offered no new proactive plans for existing metropolitan areas, 
let alone small towns."37 In addition, from the urban local authorities' 
perspective, "difficult problems were made no more tractable by the 
existence of the NRDC, L TAB and Native Affairs bureaucracies."38 
2.3 Growing fragmentation under the apartheid regime: 1950-1976 
When the National Party came into power in May 1948 and with it came the 
promulgation of the Group Areas Act.39 The Act provided for certain "group 
areas" for Africans and prohibited a member of one group to reside in a 
group area meant for another group. Finally, to entrench the permanence of 
the above separation, the Promotion of the Bantu Self-government Act40 was 
promulgated which set aside areas that would later become the so called 
"independent homelands". 
The NDRC staff: 
33 Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 205. 
34 Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 205. 
35 Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 205. 
36 Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 205. 
37 Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 205. 
38 Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 205. 
39 Act41 of 1950. 
40 Act 46 of 1959. 
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"found themselves enmeshed in the tasks of planning racial 
restructuring of the cities, for example through appointments to the 
Mentz Committee of the Department of Native Affairs (which planned 
the locations of new African townships for the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-
Vereeniging area); and in innumerable 'subsidiary planning 
committees' charged with the racial zoning of such areas as Durban, 
Pietermaritzburg and the East Rand as well as the new 'controlled 
area' towns like Welkom, Westonaria and."41 
Therefore, it was held that the NDRC became the "key national planning 
agency, the imperfect culmination of the wartime proposals for new agencies 
to carry forward the reconstruction of urban South Africa."42 
However, there were still large 'black urban areas' within white South Africa 
where blacks were living. These urban areas, more commonly known as 
townships, were regulated by the Proclamation R293 of 1962,43 which 
contained detailed provisions for the establishment, management and 
regulation of informal townships and the for the establishment of local 
government in these areas. The adoption of the Group Areas Act 36 of 1966 
ensured that other non-European residents residing in these urban areas did 
not manage to escape the ferocity of these relocation programmes. This Act 
regulated the acquisition, alienation and occupation of land for whites, 
colours and Indians and resulted in the mass removals from District 6 in 
Cape Town and Sophiatown in Johannesburg, which had since become 
'white areas'. 44 
As a result of Apartheid the country also saw the growth of new urban areas 
known as "bantustans".45 Urban planning for these areas "was largely 
41 Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 206 (footnote omitted). 
42 Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 206. 
43 Regulation 21 of the Regulations for the Administration and Control of Townships in Black Areas in terms of the Black Administration Act 18 
of 1936. 
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conducted by central authorities in Pretoria and their consultants, and to a 
lesser extent by tiny bantustan bureaucracies and their generally much more 
powerful consultants."46 
Accordingly, two distinct areas of planning arose due to the introduction of 
racial segregation into the planning regime. One area involved the planning 
of white areas, which was governed by local government authorities. The 
other area involved the planning for 'black areas', which was governed now 
by national and regional government. However, in the fifties and sixties the 
management of black informal urban settlements remained the responsibility 
of local government.47 
The increasingly fragmenting planning regime started to result in friction 
between local and national government. The national government reacted 
by giving itself further planning powers An example was the national 
governments move "to bring all urban African townships under the control of 
central government by establishing 'Bantu Affairs Administration Boards' in 
the early seventies."48 National government also established the Department 
of Community Development, which was responsible from the early sixties for 
planning within many coloured, Indian and white group areas.49 
Moreover, "similar tendencies towards centralization were evident also in 
measures to control the location of industry (the 1967 Physical Planning Act), 
the centralization of broad planning at metropolitan and regional scales in the 
early seventies ('Guide Planning'), and the establishment of the machinery 
for regional and national planning."50 The NDRC was succeeded by a 
National Department of Planning in the mid-sixties and it "absorbed the 
planning functions of both the Group Areas Board (successor to the L TAB) 
46 Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 208. 
47 Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 208. 
4a Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 208. 
49 Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 209. 
50 Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 209. 
. . 
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and the NRDC". 51 This department made further in-roads into the planning 
powers of local government in the cities by "establishing 'central guide plan 
committees' for metropolitan areas ".52 The guide plans published by these 
committees became "potentially statutory instruments, to which local 
authority plans had to conform, after 1975."53 
The integration of planning within the broader schemes of apartheid, meant 
that planning became a "sub-set of laws that included native administration, 
urban influx control, black labour, housing, land tenure and ownership, liquor 
licensing and family laws."54 All these laws were driven by the apartheid 
regimes idea of social engineering. The rural black settlements carved into a 
mix of legislative creations such as the: "South African Development Trust 
areas, self-governing territories and the TBVC states governed by the Native 
Land Act128 and Development Trust and Land Act."55 
Further development also occurred in a regional planning context. National 
government adopted a new set of development regions which cut across the 
bantustans boundaries. 56 Moreover, national government put in place a 
"non-statutory national regional development system, comprising nine 
(originally eight) regional development advisory committees (RDACs), and a 
National Regional Development Advisory Council (NRDAC), was created 
under the aegis of national government to formulate strategy in relation to 
these regions ... "57 
51 Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 209. 
52 Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 209. 
53 Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 209. 
54 Kihato Integrating planning and environmental issues through the law in South Africa 25. 
55 Kihato Integrating planning and environmental issues through the law in South Africa 29. 
56 Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 211: This suggested an acceptance by government "that those fragmented territories would 
never be economically viable on their own." . 
57 Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 211. 
In addition, government "established a Development Bank, initially to assist 
Bantustan governments, but its functions widened rapidly and numerous 
urban planning activities began to accrue to it."58 
18 
Furthermore, "existing provincial administrations were redefined as 'general 
affairs' branches of national government, and while carrying on their older 
planning functions (in newly standardized ways), they also acquired new 
responsibilities, in particular, for African areas."59 
At a local level there was an attempt in incorporating Africans politically 
through the "attempted creation of fully fledged and autonomous 'black local 
authorities' (BLAs) in 1983."60 The BLAs were entrusted with certain 
planning functions through the provision contained in the Black Communities 
Development Act61 ; however, "provincially supervised Development Boards 
(successors to Administration Boards) retained much planning control; thus, 
planning became still further fragmented."62 
2.4 Democracy- an era of reconstruction 
Eventually on 2 February 1990 President De Klerk announced to parliament 
that that the ban on the African National Congress (ANC) was to be lifted and 
that Nelson Mandela be released. The Group Areas Act63 was repealed by 
the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act.64 De Klerk also acted 
quickly to remove a range of discriminatory measures, many of which had 
direct relevance to urban planning.65 This initiative came in the form of the 
58 Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 211. 
sg Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 211. 
6o Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 211. 
61 Act 4 of 1984. 
62 Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 211. 
63 Act 36 of 1966. 
64 Act 18 of 1991. 
6s Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 214. 
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Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act, 66 which repealed a number 
of discriminatory Acts.67 
Finally, the planning regime was in a position to be freed from its previous 
"commitment to racially divided space."68 To address the urgent 
developmental needs the Less Formal Township Establishment Act69 was 
promulgated to speed up the process.70 
On the morning of the 261h of April 1994, Nelson Mandala cast his vote and 
later won the election- South Africa was truly free from the shackles of 
apartheid. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The pre-1994 government system was based on the" traditional stratified 
three-tier system of a central government at the top (and therefore the 
strongest), a second provincial tier in the middle and a local tier (the 
weakest) at the bottom." This hierarchical structure of government meant 
that the national legislature was sovereign and all-powerful, and the 
provincial and local government exercised only those powers that had been 
allocated to them by the sovereign legislature. 71 
Accordingly, the lower levels of government especially local government 
played a subordinate role. Cameron JA, as he was then, summed up the 
situation by stating that: 
66 Act 2D8 of 1991. 
67 These included: the Black Land Acts of 1913 and 1936; the Group Areas Act; and the Black Communities Development Act of 1984, 
successor to the Natives Urban Areas Act of 1923. 
6a Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 214. 
69 Act 113 of 1991. 
70 There was an "Independent Development Trust, created with a large slice of public money, decided to devote much of its resources to the 
delivery of services to 1DO ODD sites limited to those on the lowest incomes, roughly half through upgrading existing informal settlements and 
half in 'greenfield' projects." (Mabin & Smith 1997 Planning Perspectives 214). 
11 Maccsand (SCA) para 11. 
. . 
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"municipalities were at the bottom of a hierarchy of lawmaking powers; 
constitutionally unrecognised and unprotected, they were by their very 
nature subordinate members of the government vested with 
prescribed, controlled government powers."72 
Moreover, the old constitutional dispensation held that "one governmental 
department could not overrule another."73 This in effect gave national 
government departments far reaching powers and did not provide for inter-
departmental integration or cooperation. The former Minister of 
Environmental Affairs, Gert Kotze, aptly summed up this situation by 
proclaiming that he was "the Minister of Damn all!"74 
If you look at planning mandates before "1994 it was clear that the power to 
make planning laws rested with the four provinces, the former TBVC 
'independent homelands' and the 'self-governing territories'."75 However, this 
system of having numerous parallel planning authorities only further 
fragmentation the planning regime. In addition, the use of planning laws 
during the apartheid era to promote a segregated and unequal landscape 
gravely undermined the legitimacy of planning as a discipline.76 As a result, 
there was a concerted effort to move away from the tainted term "planning" 
and move towards the more progressive-sounding "development planning". 77 
In addition there was a concern that the apartheid-era planning law was 
unduly focussed on controlling development and therefore there was support 
for a paradigm shift within planning in order for planning to facilitated 
development.78 The Forum for Effective Planning and Development 
72 CDA Boerdery v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 2007 4 SA 276 (SCA) para 320. 
73 Couzens 1999 SAJELP 15. 
74 Clarke Back to Earlh 317. 
75 Berrisford & Kihato Local government planning legal frameworks 379 (footnote omitted). 
76 Berrisford 2011 Urban Form 258. 
77 Berrisford 2011 Urban Form 258. 
7a Berrisford 2011 Urban Form 258-259. 
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proposed a definition of development planning that was widely embraced.79 It 
defined development planning as: 
"a participatory approach to integrate economic, sectoral, social, 
institutional, environmental and fiscal strategies in order to support the 
optimal allocation of scarce resources between sectors and 
geographical areas and across the population in a manner that 
provides sustainable growth, equity and the empowerment of the poor 
and the marginalised."80 
The planning law regime therefore entered the new constitutional era (1996) 
driven by a new found enthusiasm and ambition to facilitate growth in a 
sustainable and co-operative manner. 
The next chapter will outline the constitutional planning mandates bestowed 
on national, provincial and local government. However, the chapter below 
will also delineate the challenges facing the planning authorities due to the 
inheritance of pre-constitutional era planning legislation. 
79 Berrisford 2011 Urban Form 259. 
80 Berrisford 2011 Urban Form 259 (footnote omitted). 
'. 
3 Chapter 3: planning law in the post-1996 constitutional era and 
its planning regulatory framework 
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This chapter focuses on the post-1996 constitutional era and its planning 
regulatory framework. The chapter will be broken up into two themes. 
Firstly, a discussion will ensue on the competencies of national, provincial 
and local government, as per the Constitution, to promulgate and administer 
planning laws. The main aim of this theme will be to provide an 
understanding of the autonomy that has been bestowed on the national, 
provincial and local planning authorities. This will serve as the foundation 
against which the regulatory framework should be compared. 
Second, a discussion of the regulatory framework within which planning 
authorities have to operate will take place. The aim of this discussion will be 
to outline the structure of the resultant planning laws and tools, with a view to 
illustrating the complexities, conflicts and overlaps inherent in the scheme. In 
addition, this discussion should reflect on the associated complexities of 
having a host of old-order-legislation operating alongside post-1996 
legislation and the consequential need for a national law to provide for a 
more holistic and integrated approach to planning. 
Before commencing theme one, it is necessary to provide an indication of the 
constitutionally envisaged relationship between the national, provincial and 
local government. The Constitution states that government consists of 
national, provincial and local spheres of government.81 The use of the word 
"sphere" is of significance as it symbolises a break away from the past 
hierarchical division of government powers.82 Now each sphere is seen as 
being self-reliant, inviolable and of an equivalent status.83 The Constitution 
makes express provision for this distinctiveness; however, it also emphasises 
81 s 40(1). 
82 In the pre Constitutional era the word 'tiers' was employed to describe the hierarchical structure of government. 
83 VanWyk Planning Law 143 (footnotes omitted). 
·, 
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that the spheres of government are interdependent and interrelated.84 These 
three principles underpin the way the respective planning authorities are to 
interact and accordingly each principle needs to be expanded upon. 
"Distinctiveness" in broader terms means that certain functions and powers 
are allocated by the Constitution to each sphere and that the respective 
sphere has the final decision making power on those matters allocated to it.85 
"Interrelated" refers to the fact that the exercise of autonomy by a particular 
sphere of government can be supervised by another sphere.86 
"Interdependent" in turn means that although each sphere has autonomy 
over certain areas it must exercise such autonomy in a manner that 
promotes the common good of the country. The way to achieve the 
successfully achieve an interrelated and interdependent relationship between 
the spheres of government is through co-operative governance. 87 
In fact, it can now be stated that the "basic structure of our government 
consists of a partnership"88 between the spheres of government, "oiled by the 
principles of co-operative government."89 The importance of co-operative 
governance cannot be overstated and therefore chapter 4 will be devoted to 
a discussion thereon. 
The next part of this chapter will focus on the constitutionally bestowed 
distinctiveness of each sphere of government in regards to their planning 
functions. More specifically, the constitutional administrative and legislative 
powers of each sphere of government will be unpacked in order to attempt to 
draw outline the parameters of their planning functions. 
84 s 40(1). 
85 Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005, s 6. 
86 Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005, s 6. 
87 Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005, s 6. 
88 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 (CC) para 82. 
89 Maccsand (Ply) Ltd and Another v City of Cape Town 2011 6 SA 633 (SCA) para 11. 
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3.1 The legislative and administrative autonomy of each sphere 
Central to planning law is the "determination of which spheres of government 
have legislative and executive competence for specified functional areas of 
planning."90 These functional areas are set out in Schedules 4 and 5 of the 
Constitution and include: "regional planning and development"; "urban and 
rural development"; "provincial planning"; and "municipal planning". 
Schedule 41ists the "Functional Areas of Concurrent National and Provincial 
Legislative Competence" and Section 51ists the "Functional Areas of 
Exclusive Provincial Legislative Competence". Part B of Schedule 4 and 5 
list the functions of local government. 
Schedule 4 and Schedule 5 will be outlined in an attempt to ascertain the 
legislative and executive autonomy of each sphere of government. The 
legislative and executive competencies are distinguished because of the fact 
that South Africa is not a unitary state. What this means is the notion that 
"the power to legislate implies the duty to administer such legislation"91 does 
not apply in South Africa. In fact, in South Africa it is not uncommon for a 
sphere of government to promulgate a law and assign the duties to another 
sphere of government. 92 Nevertheless, the focus in this part of the thesis is 
on planning autonomy, accordingly a discussion of each sphere of 
government's planning mandates, as per the Constitution, will now ensue. 
3. 1.1 National government's administrative and legislative functions 
National legislative authority is exercised by Parliament which has the power 
to pass legislation on any matter, including subject areas that fall under 
Schedule 4, but excluding Schedule 5 matters. 93 Due to Schedule 4 being 
titled "[f]unctional areas of concurrent national and provincial legislative 
9o VanWyk Planning Law 51. 
91 Glazewski Environmental law 109. 
92 Glazewski Environmental Law 109. 
93 National government may however under certain circumstances intervene in sch 5 matters. 
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competence", it is clear that national legislative mandates are "demarcated in 
relation to provincial legislative authority."94 
The Schedule 4 functional areas that are of importance in the planning 
context are "regional planning and development", "urban and rural 
development" and "municipal planning", which are set out in Schedule 4 Part 
A and the latter in Part B. 95 
Matters that fall outside of the above Schedules are subject to the exclusive 
legislative competence of national government. Accordingly, it is often stated 
that national government enjoys "residual competence" over minerals and 
water- both subject areas are not included in the Constitutional Schedules.96 
In regard to executive/ administrative authority, the national executive 
competence vests in the President and is exercised together with the 
members of Cabinet.97 This authority is exercised by administering, 
preparing and implementing national legislation, national policy and by co-
ordinating the functions of state departments.98 
3.1.2 Provincial government's legislative and administrative functions 
In a provincial context, Section 104 of the Constitution provides for the 
legislative authority of nine provincial legislatures, which collectively fall part 
of the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). In accordance with this 
Section the provincial government may pass legislation on not only Schedule 
4 and 5 matters but "any matter outside those functional areas that is 
94 VanWyk 2 Planning Law 103. 
95 This is what allows parliament to draft legislation such as the SPLUMB, which essentially deals with land use planning in a municipal 
context. 
96 The exact parameters of this "residual competence" have been historically exaggerated by national government as will be seen in the 
Maccsand Judgement, discussed in chapter 5 below. 
97 885(1). 
98 s 85(2). 
expressly assigned to the province by national legislation". 99 As stated 
above, Schedule 4 functional areas fall into the concurrent national and 
provincial legislative arena and Schedule 5 matters fall under the exclusive 
purview of province. Therefore, "Provincial planning" is an exclusive 
provincial competence as it falls under Part A of Schedule 5. 
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The executive competence vests in the premier and members of the 
respective provincial council of a particular province. 100 Provincial executive 
competence includes the administering of national legislation assigned to 
province, 101 which often deals with matters beyond the scope of Schedules 4 
and 5. 102 Accordingly, provincial executive power is exercised by preparing, 
initiating, implementing provincial legislation, provincial policy, and doing the 
same in regards to national legislation assigned to province. Moreover, 
provincial government is responsible for co-ordinating the functions of the 
provincial administrator and its departments.103 
3. 1.3 Local government's legislative and administrative functions 
As stated above the Municipal Structures Act provides for three categories of 
municipalities, namely A, B and C municipalities. 104 Accordingly, large 
metropolitan areas are governed by metropolitan (category A) municipalities 
and the rest of the country is divided into district (category C) municipalities, 
which consist of a number of local (category B) municipalities. In each type 
of municipality, the legislative and executive authority of a municipality vests 
in its respective municipal council. 105 Local government exercise legislative 
power through the promulgation of legislation known as by-laws. By-laws 
can be created on matters that are listed in Part B of Schedule 4 ("municipal 
99 s 104(1)(b). 
1oo S 125(1) and (2). 
101 Examples of national planning legislation assigned to provinces include the Removal of Restrictions Act 84 of 1967 and the Less Formal 
Townships Establishments Act 113 of 1991. 
102 S 125(2)(c). 
103 s 125(1)-(2) 
104 Part 1. 
105 s 151(2) 
planning") and Part 8 of Schedule 5. Take note, however, that by-laws 
cannot be in conflict with national or provinciallegislation. 106 
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The executive mandates of a municipality include the right to govern, on their 
own initiative, the local government affairs of their communities, subject to 
national and provinciallegislation. 107 Moreover, municipalities have the right 
to administer local government matters listed in Part 8 of Schedule 4 and 
Part 8 of Schedule 5 and any other function expressly assigned to them by 
the national or provincial legislature. 108 Section 156( 4) gives some insight in 
understanding when matters listed in Part A of Schedule 4 and 5 will be 
assigned to local government to administer. The section states that national 
and provincial government must assign to a municipality, by agreement and 
subject to any conditions, the administration of a Part A matter which 
necessarily relates to local government, if: that matter would be most 
effectively be administered locally and the municipality has the capacity to 
administer it. 
Moreover, Section 156(5) states that a municipality has the right to exercise 
any power concerning a matter reasonably necessary for, or incidental to, the 
effective performance of its functions. 
Having laid the foundation for understanding the constitutionally bestowed 
administrative and legislative planning functions of each sphere of 
government, a further discussion on the regulatory framework governing 
planning can ensue. It is necessary to reiterate that the aim of this theme is 
to provide an overview of the plethora of planning laws and tools governing 
planning and the consequential overlaps, conflicts and resulting confusion. 
106 s 156(3) 
107 s 151 (3). 
108 S 156 (1); Local government must exercise these rights in accordance with those objectives contained ins 152, namely: (a) to provide 
democratic and accountable government for local communities; (b) to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable 
manner; (c) to promote social and economic development; (d) to promote a safe and healthy environment; and (e) to encourage the 
involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government. 
3.2 The resulting legal framework governing land-use planning 
3.2. 1 Planning legislation 
National legislation that is of direct application to planning includes: the 
Removal of Restrictions Act, 109 the Less Formal Township Establishment 
Act;110 Subdivision of Agricultural Resources Act, 111 Local Government 
Transition Act, 112 Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, 113 Local 
Government: Municipal Systems Act, 114 and the DFA. 
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The Removal of Restrictions Act empowered the Administrator of a province 
to alter, suspend or remove certain restrictions and obligations in respect of 
land in the province. 115 The Subdivision of Agricultural Resources Act 
controls the subdivision and, in connection therewith, the use of agricultural 
land. As a result, agricultural land cannot be subdivided or used in 
contradiction to the Act, unless the Minister of Agriculture consents thereto. 
It has been stated that a "normative approach to physical planning, 
embracing the notion of sustainability, inter alia, was introduced through 
the ... OF A." 116 The DFA was viewed as the "flagship statute passed by 
government to set the overall framework and administrative structures for 
planning throughout the country."117 The primary objects of the DFA are to 
"facilitate and expedite the implementation of the reconstruction and 
development programmes and projects by introducing extraordinary 
measures; to lay down general principles regulating all land developments, 
irrespective of whether the development is undertaken in terms of the Act or 
1o9 Act 84 of 1967. 
110 Act 70 of 1970. 
111 Act 103 of 1997. 
112 Act 209 of 1993. 
113 Act 117 of 1998. 
114 Act 32 of 2000. 
11s It also provided for the repeal of the Removal of Restrictions in Townships Act, 1946. 
116 Todes eta/ (2009) 421. 
w Glazewski Environmental Law 207. 
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some other law; and to establish, in all provinces, development tribunal with 
powers to determine land development applications."118 The aim was for 
provinces to utilize the above principles in guiding their promulgation of 
provincial legislation. 119 However, all provinces have not followed suit due to 
various factors unique to each province. 120 
It has been stated that post-apartheid planning has refocused "towards a 
facilitative approach, concerned particularly with reconstruction and 
development.121 The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act122 requires 
municipalities to adopt an Integrated Development Plan (lOP), which is a 
single, inclusive and strategic plan for the development of its municipality. 123 
An IDP "encompasses both broad social and economic development 
planning and strategic spatial planning through spatial development 
frameworks (SDFs)."124 The Act can therefore "be seen as an example of 
national exercising its powers to set norms and standards and see to the 
effective performance by municipalities of their duties in relation to, among 
other aspects of local governance, 'municipal planning'."125 
The Physical Planning Act 125 of 1991 (the 1991 PPA) provides for structure 
plans in the form of regional development plans, regional structure plans 
(RSPs) and urban structure plans. 
The abovementioned provincial and local government planning tools are 
discussed in further detail below. 
11a GOT (CC) para 35 (footnotes omitted). 
119 Glazewski Environmental Law 207. 
120 The factors include: financial; capacity; political and practical constraints. 
121 Todes (2009) 001421. 
122 Act 32 of 2000. 
123 s 25. 
124 Todes (2009) 001421; Todes et al stated that "land use regulation, although still part of planning practice. is regarded as less important 
by many planners, and has to some extent been marginalized (Harrison et al., 2008)." ( 2009 001421 ). 
125 Berrisford & Kihato Local government planning legal frameworks 379. 
·. 
3.2.2 Planning tools- strategic planning 
It is held that "an innovation of the post-apartheid era is an emphasis on 
strategic plans to guide decision-making with regard to development 
directions, expenditure priorities and spatial organization."126 
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The purpose of an lOP is to guide the decision making of local authorities 
when considering development applications. The exact legal status of an 
lOP has brought about confusion because in Section 35 it states that it is a 
principal strategic planning instrument and that it guides all planning and 
development, but that it binds the municipality and all other persons. 
Therefore, it raises the question of whether it is guiding or binding. The issue 
is further complicated by the fact that one of the components of an lOP is a 
SOF.A SOF is a spatial plan that serves as a guideline for the development 
of a basic land use management system for a municipality. 127 Therefore, 
because a SOF falls part of an lOP the same query regarding its legal status 
arises. 128 
The next question that comes to the fore is in response to the wording of 
Section 35(2) of the Municipal Systems Act, 129 which stipulates that a SOF 
prevails over a plan as defined in the 1991 PPA. The 1991 PPA provides for 
structure plans in the form of regional development plans (ROPs), regional 
structure plans (RSPs) and urban structure plans (USPs). Accordingly, 
Section 35(2) suggests that in the event of conflict these will be trumped by a 
SOF. This can be accepted as it has been held that an approved structure 
can be viewed as "a species of subordinate legislation and thus 'law' within 
the meaning ofs 172(1)(a) of the Constitution". 130 However, the 1991 PPA 
126 Todes (2009) 001425. 
121 Municipal Systems Act, S 26(e). 
128 For an answer to the legal status of these tools see Parkhurst Village Association v Cape/a & Others 2010 JOL 25759 (GSJ). 
129 Act 32 of 2000. 




has allowed for guide plans passed under the 1967 PPA to be converted into 
RSPs. Guide plans on the other hand were definitely not considered 
subordinate legislation and once gazetted no other town planning schemes 
could be introduced or amended if it was in conflict with a guide plan. 131 
Therefore, legislature, unknowingly, might have developed a diverse beast 
and there is much uncertainty surrounding the relationship between a SDF 
and a converted guide plan. 
In addition, there is uncertainty as to the status of an SDF and a conflicting 
town planning scheme. Above it was stated that a former guide plan would 
trump a conflicting town planning scheme. Therefore, the question can be 
asked whether a SDF would also trump such a scheme.132 
3.2.3 The reshaping of jurisdictional boundaries and resulting 
legislative overlapping 
After the transition to democracy in 1994 the four provinces were replaced by 
nine new provinces, which resulted in the widespread redrawing of provincial 
boundaries. 133 However, the laws in place in a particular territory before 
1994 remained despite the new provincial boundaries. 134 This resulted in 
cross-provincial-border application of planning legislation. 135 
131 S6A(12). 
132 See Parkhurst Village Association v Cape/a & Others 2010 JOL 25759 (GSJ). 
133 Berrisford 2011 Urban Forum In 3. 
134 Berrisford 2011 Urban Forum In 3. 
135 For example, the Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985 (Cape Ordinance or LUPO) applied to the Western Cape, Eastern Cape and 
parts of North West. (VanWyk 2 ed Planning Law 284.); Furthermore, the Town Planning and Township Ordinance 15 of 1986 (Transvaal 
Ordinance) applied in Gauteng, Mpumalanga, Limpopo and North West. (VanWyk J 2 ed Planning Law 285). Accordingly, the North West 
Province, as an example, has parts of the old Cape and old Transvaal laws applicable to it. Planning legislation in other provinces includes: 
in regards to KwaZulu-Natal- The Town Planning Ordinance 27 of 1949 (Natal Ordinance), which now needs to be read with the KwaZulu-
Natal Planning and Development Act 6 of 2008; in the Free State, land use is regulated by the Townships Ordinance 9 of 1969 (Free State 
Ordinance); in the Northern Cape the Northern Cape Planning and Development Act 7 of 1998, better known as the "Northern Cape Act", is 
the provincial legislation. 
. . 
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Add to the above the reshaping of the "plethora of fragmented .. . local 
governments"136 into 258 municipalities with new boundaries that overlapped 
with old racial boundaries and the potential confusion is only amplified.137 
The above situation is further complicated once you add into the mix the 
former territories of the TBVC states and self-governing territories. 138 This is 
especially true when you take into account the often sporadic geographies of 
these "homeland areas". 139 In addition, some of the legislation of the former 
homelands that regulates township establishment and town planning in 
certain areas is still in existence and has been assigned to the provinces. 140 
As a result of the above overlaps, a planning authority in the Province of 
Gauteng, for example, will have to include in his decision making process old 
order legislation and new order legislation such as: the Transvaal Board for 
the Development of Peri-Urban Areas Ordinance, 20 of 1943; Town Planning 
& Townships Ordinance, 15 of 1986; Division of Land Ordinance, 20 of 1986; 
Gauteng Removal of Restrictions Act 3 of 1996; Gauteng Planning & 
Development Act 2 of 2003. 
136 Todes et al2009 001418. 
137 Jafta J summed up the implications hereof in the following statement: 
"where a municipally's geographical area consists of areas that fell. .. under the old Transvaal province [, for example,] and a former 
'independent' state or a self-governing homeland, different pieces of legislation may apply in these municipalities. There can be no doubt 
that this situation is undesirable." (Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal2010 6 SA 182 (CC) para 78.) 
138 The reason therefore is because the above old-order Ordinances' do not apply in the former "homeland" areas, which include the former 
territories of the TBVC states and self-governing territories. The laws applicable in the former these areas are mostly represented by the 
Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 and the Black Communities Development Act 4 of 1984, which are influential over matters such as land 
tenure and land administration arrangements. (Berrisford and Kihato Local government planning legal frameworks 383). 
139 To depict the nonsensicality of the erstwhile homeland area geographies it is only necessary to look at a few examples. KwaZulu, in 1975 
consisted of forty-eight pieces of land and scores of smaller tracks, and Bophuthatswana of nineteen pieces of land spread across three 
provinces." (Meridith The State of Africa (2005) Free Press 422). 
14° For example GN R1886 of 1990 was assigned to the Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga, KwaZulu· Natal, Limpopo, North West and Free State 
in terms of the interim Constitutions 235(8). GN R1886 of 9090 was assigned to the Cape in terms of the Provincial Government Act 69 of 
1990. GN R1888 of 1990 was assigned to Gauteng, Western Cape and Northern Cape in terms of the interim Constitution s 235(8). 
The former provides for Township development procedures and the latter for structure plans and town planning schemes. 
33 
Clearly this plethora of legislation and its geographically cross-cutting nature 
does not cater for certainty. This can be addressed, however, through the 
promulgation of a new provincial planning Act, to repeal the above list of 
legislation, and provide for a more holistic and integrated approach to 
planning in the province. 141 However, this problem is not restricted to the 
Gauteng Province. Therefore, to ensure that the planning regime develops in 
a more holistic manner a national planning law is needed to guide the 
development of provincial planning laws. 
3.3 Conclusion 
The Constitution has attempted to place certain legislative and administrative 
functions on the respective spheres of government. These include: 
"agriculture", "environment", "regional planning and development" and "urban 
and rural development" which are listed in Schedule 4 (Part A) of the 
Constitution as functional areas of concurrent national and provincial 
legislative (and concomitant executive) competence. On the other hand, 
"municipal planning" is a Schedule 4 (Part B) functional domain in respect of 
which both the national and the provincial legislatures may enact legislation 
to the extent set out in sections 155(6)(a) and (7). "Provincial planning" is an 
exclusive provincial functional domain (Schedule 5 (Part A)). 142 
However, it is also clear that the planning functions of each sphere of 
government cannot be packaged into clear-cut boxes due to the Constitution 
prescribing concurrent functional areas and due to the Constitution allowing 
141 Nevertheless, it is necessary to note that this will only repeal the old-order legislation in regards to its application in that particular 
province. Therefore, the only way for the planning law regime to rid of the apartheid legislation is through a collective effort from all nine 
provinces. This was recognised by the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform who issued a tender in 2011 calling for the 
proposals for new provincial planning legislation. (Van Wyk 2 ed Planning Law 52). The provinces have answered this call by drafting the 
necessary legislation and KwaZulu-Natal has already developed new planning legislation in the form of the KwaZulu-Natal Planning and 
Development Act 6 of 2008. Nevertheless, in order to ensure consistency amongst provinces the necessity for a national planning law could 
not be overstated. 
142 Olivier & Williams 2013 Journal for Juridical Science 127. 
for the assignment of planning functions from one sphere of government to 
another. 
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Accordingly, it is plain to see that there are many nuances governing the 
everyday interaction between the planning authorities of each sphere of 
government. This complicated relationship gives rise to a number of 
questions, namely: what if two or even all three spheres of government have 
authority over a single functional area and what is the precise content of 
these functional areas (e.g. "municipal planning", "provincial planning", 
"urban and rural development" and "regional planning and development"). 143 
The fact that the planning legislative framework does not provide direct 
answer to this is an issue. 
To give a practical illustration of the above concerns, take for example the 
"municipal planning" function. This function is listed under Schedule 4 of the 
Constitution giving both national and provincial government legislative power 
over it, but because it falls under Part B of the Schedule the administration 
thereof has been constitutionally assigned to local government. Another 
issue would be the fact that the word "planning" is used in three of the four 
functions mentioned above, which leads to the question does this word carry 
the same meaning in each of the three functions? The same can be said for 
the word "development"- used in two of the above functional areas. 
If one looks at the planning legislative framework, it is clear that it consists of 
a plethora of planning legislation and planning tools that do not always speak 
the same language. Moreover, the regime consists of three parallel sets of 
laws, namely: the provincial planning Ordinances, 144 apartheid Proclamations 
143 Berrisford and Kihato summed up the situation by stating that "interpreting what legislative concurrence means in any context is difficult, 
and in a potentially contentious field like planning, all the more so." (Berrisford & Kihato Local government planning legal frameworks 379). 
144 The irony of still having legislation developed during the apartheid era to guide planning was pointed out by Berrisford and Kihato when 
they stated that "[l]ocal government. faced with the challenge of reversing apartheid's spatial legacy and integrating previously divided 
communities, is thus hamstrung in its efforts: the only laws available to them for this task are those designed specifically to achieve the very 
thing that they are charged to undo." (Berrisford & Kihato Local government planning legal framework 377). 
• . 
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still applicable in the "homelands", and new order planning laws. 
Furthermore, these laws have jurisdictional boundaries that do not correlate 
with the new provincial boundaries of the nine provinces. Add to this the 
overlapping mandates catered for in Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution 
and you have a discombobulating framework within which the land-use 
planning authorities are expected to operate. 145 
The next chapter will provide a brief outline of the co-operative governance 
provisions and mechanism that were envisaged to provide a vital safety net 
in the midst of the potential confusion outlined above. 
145 Berrisford and Kihato described this situation by stating that the "legislative framework for planning presents a formidable regulatory 




4 Chapter 4: Constitutional tools for promoting certainty and 
cooperation 
The above chapter described the planning mandates bestowed on planning 
authorities and the confusing regulatory framework within which the planning 
authorities operate. This chapter will involve the unpacking of the potential 
laws and tools for promoting greater integration, cooperation and conflict 
resolution. 
The structure of the chapter will be as follows. First, national and provincial 
government's monitoring, support and intervening in local planning mandates 
will be discussed. This will be followed by a discussion on the legislative 
mechanisms available for resolving conflicting planning mandates. Lastly an 
analysis will be undertaken on the Constitutional principles of co-operative 
governance and other non-statutory co-operative governance mechanisms. 
4.1 Monitoring, support and intervention 
Although the spheres of government have distinctive mandates they are 
described as being interrelated. Interrelatedness is one of the main 
principles governing the interaction between the respective spheres of 
government. Accordingly, the spheres of government are not expected to 
exercise their functions in an isolated vacuum. 
The Constitution instils a duty on national and provincial government to 
monitor local government. 146 Provincial government must provide for the 
146 Practitioners Guide to Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) 33. 
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monitoring 147 and support of local government in their respective province. 148 
Moreover, national and provincial government must see to the performance 
of municipalities.149 The Constitution also contains a general instruction that 
all three spheres of government must support one another. 150 The 
Constitution also contains more toothy provisions that allow for the unilateral 
interference by one sphere into the affairs of another.151 In this regard, 
national government can intervene in the affairs of provincial and local 
government in terms of Section 1 00; and province can interfere in local 
government in accordance with Section 139. 
Monitoring, support and intervention are discussed in isolation below. Each 
concept is discussed in isolation on order to determine whether the 
Constitution and other legislation provides for defined parameters that are to 
govern each concept. This discussion will take place through a planning law 
lens. 
4.1.1 Monitoring of local government152 
Section 155(6) of the Constitution states that each province must provide for 
the monitoring of local government to promote the development of local 
government capacity to enable municipalities to perform their functions and 
manage their own affairs. Accordingly, province must monitor local 
government to ensure that it is performing its "municipal planning" functions. 
The Municipal Systems Act153 was promulgated partly to aid provincial 
government in fulfilling the above Constitutional duties. The Act allows 
national and provincial government to set standards against which local 
147 "Monitoring occurs when one sphere measures the compliance of another sphere with legislative directives" (Practttioners Guide to IGR 
33). 
148 S 155(6)(a). 
149 s 155(7). 
150 "Support refers to measures of assistance to ensure that another sphere is able to perform adequately" (Practitioners Guide to IGR 34 ). 
151 "Intervention is the unilateral interference by one sphere into the affairs of another in order to remedy an unacceptable situation" 
(Practitioners Guide to IGR Systems 34). 
152 See the Practitioners Guide to /GR 34-36 for a detailed discussion of monitoring mechanisms. 
153 Act 32 of 2000. 
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municipalities can be monitored. 154 The Municipal Systems Act allows 
national and provincial government to pass laws requiring local government 
to submit information in the form of reports. 155 In limited circumstances the 
Act empowers the MEC for Local Government to demand information from 
local government and appoint a Commission of Enquiry. 156 However, this 
can only take place if there is reason to believe that a municipality "cannot or 
does not fulfil a statutory obligation binding on that municipality or that 
maladministration, fraud, corruption or any other serious malpractice has 
occurred or is occurring in a municipality". 157 
The Minister (responsible for Provincial and Local Government) also has the 
duty to compile a report on the performance of municipalities weighed 
against their fulfilment of key performance indicators. 158 
4. 1.2 Support 159 
Section 125(3) of the Constitution instructs national government to support 
provincial government. Moreover, Section 154(1) instructs both national and 
provincial government to support and strengthen local government capacities 
to perform their functions. Interestingly, Section 155(6) once again obliges 
province to do the above. Accordingly, it is assumed that province will be the 
main role player in the support of local government, which seems sensible 
given the closer relationship between the two spheres. Moreover, there is a 
clear focus on capacity building of local government. The main focus, for 
purposes of this thesis, is on the 'municipal planning' function. 
154 Chapter 10. 
155 Chapter 10. 
156 8106. 
157 8106. 
158 s 43. 
159 See the Practitioners Guide to IGR 36-38 for a detailed discussion of support mechanisms. 
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4. 1.3 Intervention 160 . 
Unilateral intervention by one sphere government into the affairs of another 
sphere effectively results in the usurping of functions by the intervening 
sphere. Moreover, as shown above, certain functions have been designated 
exclusively by the Constitution to a particular sphere of government. 
Accordingly, intervention cannot take place willy-nilly as this would constitute 
a direct attack on the autonomy (distinctiveness) of another sphere of 
government. As a minimum it should first be shown that the monitoring and 
support mechanisms have been unable to remedy the shortcomings of the 
respective local government in the undertaking of its municipal planning 
functions. 161 
National intervention in provincial affairs is governed by Section 1 00 of the 
Constitution. When considering this Section the "provincial planning" 
functions must be kept in mind. Forthwith, Section 100 states that the 
national executive may only intervene "when the province cannot or does not 
fulfil an executive obligation in terms of the Constitution or legislation". 
Moreover, it defines that the intervention can be in the form of a directive 
issued to province stating the extent of the failure and the required steps to 
be taken to rectify the situation.162 Intervention can also take place by 
national government if intervention is necessary to: "(i) maintain essential 
national standards or meet established minimum standards for the rendering 
of a service; (ii) maintain economic unity; (iii) maintain national security; (iv) 
or prevent that province from taking unreasonable action that is prejudicial to 
the interest of another province or to the country as a whole."163 Point of (i) 
and (iv) are of particular relevance to planning. It is important to note that 
national government intervention into the affairs of province can only take 
place under specific circumstances. Moreover, national government must 
160 See the Practitioners Guide to IGR 41-59 for a detailed discussion of intervention. 
161 Practitioners Guide to JGR 41. 
162 S 100(1)(a). 
163S 100(1)(b). 
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submit a written notice to the NCOP 14 days after the intervention began and 
may not continue if the Council disapproves of such intervention.164 Notably 
the Constitution does not state that this intervention is subject to the 
procedures set out in Section 76, which caters for the negotiation between 
the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces and allows for 
disputes to be referred to the Mediation Committee. 
Province may intervene in local government matters in accordance with 
Section 139 of the Constitution. Once again the identical phrase that is used 
in Section 100 is used in this section, namely that intervention may take 
place only when a municipality "cannot or does not fulfil an executive 
obligation in terms of the Constitution or legislation". 165 Similarly, methods of 
intervention allowed include the issuing of a directive or the assuming of 
responsibility to the extent necessary to ensure points (i) and (ii) above and 
to "prevent that Municipal Council from taking unreasonable action that is 
prejudicial to the interests of another municipality or to the province as a 
whole" .166 Provision is made for an additional form of intervention, namely 
the "dissolving the Municipal Council and appointing an administrator until a 
newly elected Municipal Council has been declared elected, if exceptional 
circumstances warrant such a step."167 
Intervention seems to be the method of last resort given the cautionary 
language used- "cannot or does not", "extent necessary", "exceptional 
circumstances". The need for caution is further confirmed by the fact that the 
intervening provincial executive must submit a written notice to the Cabinet 
member responsible for local government and the NCOP. Both can 
disapprove within 28 days of the intervention. Strikingly this does not allow 
the Municipal Council any say, which makes clear sense if the council had 
been dissolved but if this is not the case it is testament to the extremities of 
164 s 1 00(2). 
165 s 139(1). 
166 s 139(1)(b)(ii). 
167 s 139(1)(b)(iii). 
. . 
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this intervention as local government will effectively lose all control over its 
functions. Accordingly, this must be read in light of Section 151(4) of the 
Constitution which clearly states that "national or provincial government may 
not compromise or impede a municipality's ability to exercise its powers or 
perform its functions." 
In summation: the Constitution allows for the intrusion by one sphere into the 
competencies of another but such intrusion should only take place as a last 
resort and even then should be exercised with extreme caution. Moreover, 
the aim of such intervention should be in light of supporting and 
strengthening the capacity of the other sphere. More eloquently put, the 
intervention should be solution-oriented and aim not merely to fulfil an 
obligation that a province or a municipality failed to fulfil, but to ensure that it 
will be fulfilled in future.168 
4.2 Constitutional conflict resolution 
As was stated in Chapter 3 above, one of the main questions that arise in 
regards to Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution is- what if two or even all 
three spheres of government have authority over a single functional area? 
4.2.1 Schedule 4 conflicts 
Schedule 4 contains functional areas of both national and provincial 
government. Therefore how are national and provincial legislative conflicts to 
be addressed? Section 146 of the Constitution provides an answer to 
resolving potential Schedule 4 conflicts. 
Section 146(2) stipulates that national legislation that is of general application 
prevails over provincial legislation if any of the following conditions are met: 
1aa Practitioners Guide to JGR 41. 
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(a) The national legislation deals with a matter that cannot be 
regulated effectively by legislation enacted by the respective provinces 
individually. 
(b) The national legislation deals with a matter that, to be dealt with 
effectively, requires uniformity across the nation, and the national 
legislation provides that uniformity by establishing -
(i) norms and standards; 
(ii) frameworks; or 
(iii) national policies. 
(c) The national legislation is necessary for-
(i) the maintenance of national security; 
(ii) the maintenance of economic unity; 
(iii) the protection of the common market in respect of the mobility of 
goods, services, capital and labour; 
(iv) the promotion of economic activities across provincial boundaries; 
(v) the promotion of equal opportunity or equal access to government 
services; or 
(vi) the protection of the environment. 
Moreover, Section 146(3) states that: 
"National legislation prevails over provincial legislation if the national 
legislation is aimed at preventing unreasonable action by a province 
that-
(a) is prejudicial to the economic, health or security interests of 
another province or the country as a whole; or 
(b) impedes the implementation of national economic policy. 
Nevertheless, provincial government is given a voice in certain instances. 
For example, Section 146(4) states that when there is a dispute concerning 
whether national legislation is necessary for a purpose set out in subsection 
(2)(c) and that dispute comes before a court for resolution, the court must 
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have due regard to the approval or the rejection of the legislation by the 
NCOP. In addition, provincial legislation prevails over national legislation if 
subsection (2) or (3) does not apply. 169 Moreover, a law made in terms of an 
Act of Parliament or a provincial Act can prevail only if that law has been 
approved by the NCOP .170 
4.2.2 Schedule 5 conflicts 
In the context of Schedule 5, the Constitution states that national legislation 
referred to in Section 44(2) prevails over provincial legislation in respect of 
matters within the functional areas listed in Schedule 5. 171 Section 44(2) 
reads: 
"Parliament may intervene, by passing legislation in accordance with 
section 76(1 ), with regard to a matter falling within a functional area 
listed in Schedule 5, when it is necessary -
(a) to maintain national security; 
(b) to maintain economic unity; 
(c) to maintain essential national standards; 
(d) to establish minimum standards required for the rendering of 
services; or 
(e) to prevent unreasonable action taken by a province which is 
prejudicial to the interests of another province or to the country as a 
whole." 
4.2.3 Intervention by courts- conflicts that cannot be resolved 
However, the question a begging is what is the procedure to be followed if a 
conflict cannot be resolved? The Constitution provides guidance in this 
169 s 146(5). 
170 s 146(6). 
171 s 147(2). 
• 
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regard by stating that if a dispute concerning a conflict cannot be resolved by 
a court, the national legislation prevails over the provinciallegislation. 172 In 
the event that a court does rule that legislation prevails over other legislation, 
the Constitution provides that that the other legislation is not invalidated but it 
becomes inoperative for as long as the conflict remains. 173 
However, the Constitution guides the courts in the above decision making by 
stating that when considering an apparent conflict between national and 
provincial legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of 
the legislation or constitution that avoids a conflict, over any alternative 
interpretation that results in a conflict. 174 
4.3 Co-operative governance (interdependence) 
At this point in the thesis it has been depicted that the spheres of government 
are distinctive, yet also interrelated. The next theme guiding government 
relations is "interdependence". By saying that the spheres of government are 
interdependent it means that "each sphere must exercise its autonomy to the 
common good of the country by co-operating with the other spheres."175 
Accordingly, as stated above, the interaction between spheres of government 
is supposed to resemble a relationship similar to that of a partnership. 176 
Consequently, the "notion of interrelatedness is ... not about making legally 
binding decisions that affect another sphere. Instead, it is about co-operation 
through joint planning, fostering friendly relations and avoiding conflict."177 
It has been said that this partnership needs to be "oiled by the principles of 
co-operative government"178 to ensure more effective, integrated and 
172 s 148. 
173 s 149. 
174 The Constitutional Court held in National Gambling Board v Premier of KwaZu/u-Nata/2002 2 BCLR 156 (CC) that the relevant 
government department should "re-evaluate its position fundamentally ... to consider alternative possibilities and compromises" (para 36) and 
thus indicated that government departments should try and not litigate against each other. 
175 Practitioners Guide to IGR 6. 
176 This can be juxtaposed with the pre-constitutional tiered approach to governance. 
m Practitioners Guide to IGR 6. 




streamlined governance and process. To help conceptualise the above 
relationship it is useful to view the constitutional provisions and Schedules as 
the engine and to view co-operative governance as the oil needed for this 
engine to operate smoothly and effectively. Naturally, the one cannot exist 
without the other. 
The rest of this chapter outlines the co-operative governance provisions 
provided for by the Constitution and other legislation, including other 
statutory and non-statutory co-operative governance mechanisms. However, 
first the parameters of co-operative governance as a concept will be 
unpacked and the functions of co-operative governance outlined. 
4.3.1 Unpacking the confines of co-operative governance 
The parameters of co-operative governance as a concept is best understood 
by discussing each of the terms in isolation. "Governance" is a function of 
public administration which has been defined as: 179 
"the use of managerial, political and legal theories and processes to 
fulfill legislative, executive and judicial governmental mandates for the 
provision of regulatory and service functions for the society as a whole 
or for some segments of it." 
In addition, "governance" has been described as "all processes, 
organisations and individuals (the latter acting in official positions and roles) 
that are associated with carrying out laws and other policy measures adopted 
by the legislature or the executive and interpreted by courts."180 
The Commission on Global Governance describes "governance" as "the sum 
of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage 
their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or 
179 Feris 2010 PEJL 75 (footnotes omitted). 
1ao Feris 2010 PEJL 75 (footnotes omitted). 
~. 
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diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be 
taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce 
compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions 
either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest."181 In essence 
"governance"182 involves a decision-making process, "i.e. decisions relating 
to managerial, political and legal processes, and that grant privileges and 
powers."183 
Before discussing the definition of "co-operative" it is necessary to outline 
what constitutes "good governance". "Good governance" is dependent on 
how these decisions are made, implemented and executed. 184 Section 195 
of the Constitution provides some guidance in this regard, as it requires that 
"public administration be governed by the democratic principles and values 
enshrined in the Constitution and that it be inter alia accountable, 
transparent, and efficient and that it should involve public participation."185 
Accordingly, it is held that Section 195 "sets a yardstick for decision-making 
from a good governance perspective."186 
"Co-operative", on the other hand, is the act of "aligning and integrating 
governance across spheres so as to ensure coherence ... It is different from 
supervision in that it takes place in a context of equality: each participating 
181 Weiss "Governance, good governance and global governance: conceptual and actual challenges." 2000 (21 :5) Third world quarterly 797 
(footnote omitted). 
182 For a number of further definition of "governance" see Weiss 2000 Third world quarterly 797. For example, the World Bank "has identified 
three distinct aspects of governance: (i) the form of political regime; (ii) the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a 
country's economic and social resources for development; and (iii) the capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement policies 
and discharge functions." In addition, the UNDP states that governance "is viewed as the exercise of economic, political and administrative 
authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups 
articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences." (Weiss 2000 Third world quarterly 
797 (footnotes omitted)). 
183 Feris 2010 PEJL 75. 
184 Feris 2010 PEJL 75. 
185 Feris 2010 PEJL 75. 
186 Feris 2010 PEJL 75. 
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sphere is an equal partner."187 
4.3.2 Function of co-operative governance 
Watts RL once stated that: 
"Interdependence between governments and hence the need for 
effective intergovernmental relations and cooperation is a 
characteristic of all multisphere, multi-tier or multi-level forms of 
government, whether federal or constitutionally decentralized unitary 
in form. This is so because in such systems it is never possible to 
divide jurisdiction among governments in watertight exclusive 
compartments. Overlap and interpenetration of jurisdiction is 
inevitable" .188 
"Co-operative governance" is therefore of immense value as it can provide 
for an integrated and streamlined governance process as well as a planning 
law process. It will allow for negotiation, which will in turn aid "the organs of 
government involved in the same functional area [to] agree to allocate 
specific tasks to a particular sphere, in the spirit of co-operative government 
and mutual trust."189 Co-operative governance should operate as a planning 
mandates overlay in that it should permeate into the everyday interaction 
between the land-use planning authorities. It can be used as a mechanism 
to bypass the potential stumbling blocks caused by lack of certainty within 
the planning mandates arena. A co-operative approach is always "preferable 
as immediate clarity relevant to the parties is achieved without complex and 
cumbersome legislative or judicial proceedings."190 
187 Practitioners Guide to JGR 51. 
188 Watts Intergovernmental relations (Department of Constitutional Development and Provincial Affairs Pretoria 1999) 6-7. 
189 Practitioners Guide to JGR 38. 
190 Practitioners Guide to /GR 38. 
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4.3.3 Constitutional co-operative governance provisions 
As stated above, each sphere of government is mandated with distinct 
governmental functions. However, the execution of these distinct functions 
should be premised on the on the constitutionally entrenched principle of co-
operative governance. 191 
The co-operative governance principles are found in Chapter 3 of the 
Constitution. Chapter 3 states that "[all] spheres of government must 
observe and adhere to the principles in this Chapter and must conduct their 
activities within the parameters that the Chapter provides."192 This is followed 
by a list of co-operative governance and intergovernmental relations and an 
express obligation on "all spheres of government and all organs of state" to 
follow them. 193 Section 41 of the Constitution states that: 
"All spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere 
must: ... 
(e) respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions 
of government in other spheres; 
(f) not assume any power or function except those conferred on them 
in terms of the Constitution; 
(g) exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that 
does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional 
integrity of government in another sphere; 
(h) co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by-
(i) fostering friendly relations; 
(ii) assisting and supporting one another; 
191 Bosman, Kotze & DuPlessis 2004 (19) SAPRIPL 412. 
192 s 40(2). 
193 s 41(1). 
-. 
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(iii) informing one another of, and consulting one another on matters of 
common interest; 
(iv) co-ordinating their actions and legislation with one another; 
(v) adhering to agreed procedures; and 
(vi) avoiding legal proceedings against one another." 
The "significance of this chapter is that every conceivable functionary in 
every sphere of government will have to be reminded continually of the 
principles of co-operative government contained in Chapter 3, not only for co-
operation in general but also because the principles reinforce the values 
underlying open, transparent and responsible government."194 
In addition, the Constitution states that in the event of an intergovernmental 
dispute the parties involved "must make every reasonable effort to settle the 
dispute by means of mechanism and procedures provided for that purpose, 
and must exhaust all other remedies before it approaches a court to resolve 
the dispute."195 However, it is important to note that the: 
"provisions of chapter 3 are not meant to diminish the power of one 
organ of state at the expense of another. Rather, it presupposes and 
emphasises the willingness by all spheres of government to work 
together. For this to materialise, it is essential that conflict between 
laws is avoided, and the administration of the implementation of these 
laws is clearly regulated by way of co-ordination."196 
Nevertheless, the implementation of the above has its challenges. If you 
look at planning law alone it is clear that a "number of functional areas are 
interwoven with planning such as agriculture, environment, housing and 
194 Van Wyk Planning Law 144. 
195 841(3). 
196 Bosman et al2004 SAPRIPL 413 (footnote omitted). 
transport."197 It is logical that "all these functional areas cannot all be the 
administrative responsibility of one government department; [therefore] 
principles of co-operative government must feature significantly."198 
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However, in this intertwined planning arena conflict between the respective 
authorities is inevitable and therefore "a number of institutions, procedures, 
and mechanisms are provided to facilitate conflict resolution in a co-operative 
spirit (Bray 1999 SAJELP4)."199 
The above institutions, procedures and mechanisms are provided by a 
number of statutorl00 and non-statutory co-operative governance initiatives 
that are discussed below. 
4.4 Co-operative non-statutory mechanisms and the 
Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 
There are numerous non-statutory mechanisms that have been developed 
over time that have seen varying success in achieving co-operative 
governance. These include, for example, the: Inter-Governmental Forum 
(IGF); Ministerial Forums (MINMECs and MINTECHs); the Premier Forum;201 
the Forum for South African Director Generals;202 and the signing of Service 
Delivery Outcome Agreements.203 
197 Van Wyk Planning Law 145 (footnotes omitted). 
198 van Wyk Planning Law 145. 
199 Bosman et al2004 SAPRIPL 413. 
200 Namely, NEMA and the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005. 
201 Meeting of the nine premiers of the respective provinces. 
202 The Forum for South African Directors-General is an example of an informal intergovernmental relations structure, which is an example of 
administrative intergovernmental relations between officials and structures that exist for administrative purposes (Malan (2005) Politiea 236). 
Malan L explains that the "Forum for South African Directors-General was created to discuss mutual problems, share experiences and learn 
from each other in terms of the administration of the different provinces and to promote coordination between national and provincial 
departments. The overarching objective of the Forum for South African Directors-General is to promote section 41 of the Constitution, 
pertaining to co-operative government." (Malan (2005) Politiea 236). 
203 Paterson A states that "these initiatives have recently been complemented by the signing of service delivery agreements between national 
and provincial authorities to improve the coordination of the functions and responsibilities." (Paterson (2011) case note In 234) 
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The IGF was comprised of the premiers of provinces and representatives of 
national government; however, the IGF has been abolished "due to its size, 
cost, lack of focus, no linkages with other fora and the fact that it was used 
as an 'information sharing exercise' ."204 
MINMECs205 emerged as a result of the need to oversee the joint concurrent 
competency between spheres as contained in Schedule 4, which contains 
national and provincial planning functions.206 MINMECs comprise: the 
relevant national Minister; the Deputy Minister; the nine provincial MECs in 
the same functional area; and local government representatives if the 
function is related to Schedule 48 and 58 of the Constitution.207 How the 
MINMEC process operates is as follows. If national legislation is to be 
promulgated that impacts upon provinces then it will usually be introduced at 
MINMECs where the relevant Minister will seek support from MECs for the 
Bill before it is submitted to the Cabinet.208 By having province actively 
participate in MINMECs it allows for them to have a greater influence 
because they are involved at an early stage of the national legislative 
process. This is also beneficial for national government as it allows for 
provincial insights and speeds up the process because when the Bill is 
submitted to Cabinet it will already have the stamp of approval from 
province.209 Moreover, MINMEC debates can play a vital role in conflict 
resolution of present or potential future conflicts between the spheres.210 
Lastly, MINMECs give province and local government the opportunity, 
through their input and knowledge, to help shape national policy and 
priorities.211 
2o4 Ne12004 SA Public Law footnote 36. 
2os For further details on MINMECs see the Practitioners Guide to IGR 66-67 and Malan 2005 Politeia 233-234. 
2o6 Practitioners Guide to IGR 66. 
2o7 Practitioners Guide to IGR 66. 
2oa Practitioners Guide to IGR 66. 
2o9 Practitioners Guide to IGR 66. 
210 Practitioners Guide to IGR 67. 
211 Practitioners Guide to IGR 67. 
. . 
52 
However, problems experienced include "domination by national ministers, 
provincial MECs have no mandate from their executive committees, 
attendance, lack of communication, only information is shared, no monitoring 
of decisions.( Reddy (2001) Politeia 32) "212 In addition, it has been held that 
the MINMEC meetings focus on political agendas as opposed to a focus on 
executive and procedural issues.213 
Paterson A explains that "the MINTECH structures are 'technical committees' 
comprising of the national line function Director-General and his/her 
respective provincial Head of Departments. Their function is generally to 
achieve 'administrative or technical harmony' within the different spheres of 
government."214 
The Forum for South African Directors-General is an example of an informal 
intergovernmental relations structure, which is an example of administrative 
intergovernmental relations between officials and structures that exist for 
administrative purposes.215 Malan L explains that the "Forum for South 
African Directors-General was created to discuss mutual problems, share 
experiences and learn from each other in terms of the administration of the 
different provinces and to promote coordination between national and 
provincial departments. The overarching objective of the Forum for South 
African Directors-General is to promote section 41 of the Constitution, 
pertaining to co-operative government."216 
It must be noted that "these initiatives have recently been complemented by 
the signing of service delivery agreements between national and provincial 
212 Nel2004 SA Public Law footnote 38. 
213 Peart & Wilson 1998 SAJELP 237. 
214 Paterson 2011 SA Publiekreg/ SA Public Law footnote 234. 
215 Malan 2005 Politiea 236. 
21s Malan 2005 Politiea 236. 
. . 
authorities to improve the coordination of the functions and 
responsibilities."217 
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The role and functions of the various Committees of MINMEC were 
formalised in terms of the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 2005 
(IRFA),218 to enable these structures to have more binding decision-making 
powers?19 The IRFA was promulgated in 2005 and is administered by the 
department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs. The Act 
aims to give effect "to the constitutional requirement regarding structures and 
institutions to promote intergovernmental relations (IGR) and mechanisms 
and procedures to facilitate dispute resolution."220 The underlying purpose of 
the IRFA is to serve to encourage the spheres of government in the 
implementation of legislation and policy, and to promote certainty, stability, 
predictability, transparency and accountability within the system of IGR.221 
The IRFA "creates various structures on national, provincial and local level 
as well as on interdepartmental and inter-sphere level to give effect to co-
operative governance."222 These structures "include a president's 
coordinating council consisting of the president, deputy-president, minister in 
the presidency, Minister of Finance, other ministers, premiers of the 
provinces and a municipal councillor designated by the organised local 
government structure. "223 
In addition, the IRFA also makes provision for "the establishment of national 
intergovernmental forums to discuss matters of national interest and to deal 
211 Paterson 2011 SA Publiekreg! SA Public Law footnote 234. 
21a For a more in depth discussion on the IRFA and co-operative governance see Edwards 2008 Politeia 65-85; Practitioners Guide to IGR 
51-78; and Malan 2005 Politeia 226-243. 
219 Malan 2005 Politiea 233. 
220 Practitioners Guide to IGR 52. 
221 Practitioners Guide to IGR 52. 
222 DuPlessis 2008 SAPRIPL 104. 
223 DuPlessis 2008 SAPRIPL 104. 
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inter alia with the coordination and alignment of functional areas in section 
1 0."224 The forum is tasked with, for example, discussing performance in the 
provision of services and initiating corrective action where failure occurs.225 
Moreover, the Act through Section 11 makes provision for provincial 
intergovernmental forums.226 These forms include the premier, relevant 
members of the provincial executive council and mayors of district and 
metropolitan municipalities, administrators or municipal councillors. More 
specifically, "this forum consists of the responsible minister, deputy minister, 
relevant MECs of the provinces, and municipal councillors within the 
functional area of Schedule 48 and 58 of the Constitution."227 Part 4 of IRFA 
makes provision for similar structures to be developed at a local government 
level. 
The IRFA also makes provision for the intergovernmental forums to establish 
intergovernmental technical support structures comprising officials or other 
persons who can assist in supporting the forum.228 However, it is important 
to note that these technical support structures are formed to facilitate 
intergovernmental consultation and they are not decision-making bodies 
themselves. Nevertheless they may adopt resolutions or make 
recommendations in terms of agreed procedures.229 
Importantly, the Act provides for coordination when it comes to 
implementation of a policy, the exercise of a statutory power, the 
performance or the provision of a service that may depend on the 
224 DuPlessis 2008 SAPRIPL 104. 
22s DuPlessis 2008 SAPRIPL 104. 
22s Examples of existing provincial intergovernmental relations structures include: the Eastern Cape Provincial Political Intergovernmental 
Forum, Free State Provincial and Local Government Coordinating Committee, Gauteng Intergovernmental Forum, Gauteng Premie(s 
Coordinating Committee, KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Cabinet Clusters, Mpumalanga Intergovernmental Relations Forum, North West 
Intergovernmental Forum and the Western Cape Provincial Advisory Forum. (Malan 2005 Politiea 235). 
221 DuPlessis 2008 SAPRIPL footnote 99. 
2288 30. 
229 s 32. 
.. 
participation of another organ of state?30 The Act caters for this by making 
provision for parties to enter into implementation protocols.231 
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Section 40 states that all organs of state must make every reasonable effort 
to avoid intergovernmental disputes when exercising their functions and to 
settle disputes without resorting to judicial proceedings. In this regard 
guidelines have been published to regulate intergovernmental dispute 
prevention and settlements,232 "which could play an important role in 
decision-making ... "233 
Therefore in summation the IRFA sets out to achieve its objectives by 
creating a statutory framework dealing with: key principles of co-operative 
government and IGR; intergovernmental forums that form the institutional 
spine of IGR; implementation protocols that facilitate integrated service 
delivery; and rules for the settlement of intergovernmental disputes. 234 
4.5 Conclusion 
The Constitution clearly provides for the monitoring and support of local 
government. In regards to Schedule 48 matters, for example, national and 
provincial government only have administrative authority if operating under 
the umbrella of support or within the strict confines that allow for intervention. 
Nevertheless, in practice it seems that the parameters within which 
supervision should occur remain fuzzy. 235 
230 s 35(1 ). 
231 S 35(2) sets out exactly when a implementation protocol should be considered and section 35(3) sets out what an implementation protocol 
must cover, which includes identification of the challenges, description of roles and responsibilities and provide for dispute-settlement 
procedures and mechanisms etc. 
232 For example, see GN 491 in GG 29845 of 2007-04-26 and GN 1770 in GG 29422 of 2006-11-27. 
233 DuPlessis 2008 SAPRIPL 105. 
234 Practitioners Guide to IGR 52; for a more detailed discussion of the IRFA see Du Plessis 2008 SAPRIPL 1 04-105; also see Malan 2005 
Politiea 226-243. 
235 See the Lagoon Bay judgments, which will be discussed later in this thesis, for a good example of the lack of certainty surrounding this 
supervisory function. 
The Constitution makes provision for conflict resolution by providing clear 
rules and guidelines. However, in light of Chapter 3 and the obligation 
placed on the spheres to fulfil their planning functions in a co-operative 
manner, it seems that the conflict resolution provision serve as a matter of 
last resort as opposed to being utilised in the first instance. 
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Nevertheless, there seems to be a host of co-operative governance 
provisions and mechanisms that could be utilised before resorting to the 
constitutional conflict resolution rules and guidelines. These can be found in 
the Constitution, NEMA (albeit in an environmental context), the IRFA and 
other non-statutory initiatives. 
It is clear that the co-operative governance provisions and mechanisms have 
to overcome certain challenges arising due to the lack of legal certainty 
within the planning law regime. However, it seems trite that this uncertainty 
could have been dealt with had the respective spheres of government, and 
their line departments, fully embraced and utilised the co-operative 
governance provisions and mechanisms provided. Nevertheless, this all-
powerful concept of co-operative governance inserted in legislation as a 
safety neUsave all tool is in practice not the magic wand the legislature 
pictured it to be. The lack of utilisation of the co-operative governance 
provisions and mechanisms has resulted in each sphere of government and 
line departments fending for their own interests and needs and refusing to 
surrender to the interests and needs of the other spheres of government and 
their respective line departments. 
Why the co-operative governance mechanisms have failed in the planning 
context cannot be attributed to a single factor. Perhaps it can be contributed 
to the mere non-willingness of officials. 236 However, the fact that planning 
law at present is governed by an array of old order and new order legislation 
is surely a factor. With this often indecipherable mix bag of legislation, it is 
difficult for planning authorities to know the exact parameters of their powers 
236 Nel & DuPlessis 2004 Public Law 181 (footnote omitted}. 
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and duties, which caters for conflict. This issue is further convoluted by the 
overabundance of land-use planning tools supposedly operating alongside 
one another. It is only understandable that this setup "could lead to 
inconsistency in decision-making and even conflict among and between 
spheres of government that cannot be resolved with reference to the 
provisions on co-operative governance alone."237 Once again this reiterates 
the desperate need for a national planning law in South Africa. 
The next chapter will outline the resulting conflicts and jurisprudence that 
have arisen due to the lack of legal certainty within the planning law regime 
and the unwillingness by government to utilise the co-operative governance 
mechanisms and procedures. The main question that needs to be kept in 
mind throughout this analysis is: have the courts provided a sufficient amount 
of legal certainty with regard to the planning mandates of the respective 
spheres of government. 
237 Bosman et al2004 SAPR!PL 411. 
-. 
5 Chapter 5: the role of the judiciary in clarifying planning 
mandates 
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Despite the comprehensive array of provisions seeking to promote clarity and 
co-operative governance - confusion and conflict abounds. The judiciary 
has therefore been left with the task of trying to resolve these matters. The 
courts have addressed various points of conflict between the national and 
local government, the local government and statutory authority, and the 
provincial and local government. Case law on these areas of conflict will be 
analysed and discussed in detail. The conflicts that will be discussed in this 
thesis include those between national and local government (i.e. Swart/and 
Municipality v Louw (WCC);i City of Cape Town v Maccsand (Pty) Ltd 
(WCC);ii Maccsand (Pty) Ltd and Another v City of Cape Town and Others 
(SCA);iii Maccsand (Pty) Ltd and Another v City of Cape Town and Others 
(CC);iv Mtunzini Conservancy v Tronox KZN Sands (Pty) Ltd and Another 
(KZDHC)).v 
It will also include conflicts between local government and statutory 
authorities (i.e. Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng 
Development Tribunal (W);vi City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v 
Gauteng Development Tribunal and Others (SCA);vii Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal (CC)).238 
In addition, matters dealing with the conflicts between provincial government 
and local government will be unpacked (i.e. Habitat Council and Another v 
Provincial Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and 
Development Planning in the Western Cape and Others; City of Cape Town 
v Provincial Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and 
Development Planning in the Western Cape and Others (WCC);viii Lagoon 
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Bay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Local Government, 
Environmental Affairs and Development Planning of the Western Cape and 
Others (WCC);ix Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd v The Minister for Local 
Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning of the 
Western Cape and Others (SCA);x and The Minister for Local Government, 
Environmental Affairs and Development Planning of the Western Cape v 
Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd and Others (CC)).xi 
Lastly, the matters involving private developers challenging government for 
exercising "ultra vires" powers will also be unpacked by analysing the 
following case law: i.e. RA Le Sueur v e Thekwini Municipality (KZP);239 
Shelfplett 47(Pty) Ltd v MEG for Environmental Affairs and Development 
Planning and Another (WCC);240 Glairison's CG v the MEG for Local 
Government Environmental Affairs and Development Planning and Bitou 
Municipality 2012 3 SA 128 (WCC);241 and MEG for Environmental Affairs 
and Development Planning v Glairison's GG (SCA).242 
Accordingly, the courts have been provided with an opportunity to provide 
legal certainty on a number of key issues. These key issues serve as the 
respective themes of discussion in this chapter, namely: (i) Defining the 
bounds of Municipal Planning; (ii) Defining the Bounds of Provincial Planning 
and Regional Planning and Development; (iii) Clarifying the planning domain 
of Statutory Planning Authorities and Local Planning Authorities; (iv) 
Resolving Conflicts between Environmental Mandates and Planning 
Mandates; (v) Drawing a line between Provincial Planning Mandates and 
Local Planning Mandates; and (vi) Providing Clarity on the Form, Nature and 
Status of Planning Tools (particularly Provincial Structure Plans, SDFs, lOPs 
239 2013 JDR 0178 (KZP). 
24o 2012 3 SA 441 (WCC). 
241 2012 3 SA 128 (WCC). 
242 (408/2012) [2013] SCA 82. 
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and Structure Plans). Each of these themes will be discussed below in 
greater detail. 
5.1 Defining the bounds of "municipal planning" 
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Local government finds itself at the coalface of the planning law regime. Its 
direct link with the community and its intimate knowledge of the micro-
planning arena has led to it being assigned powers and duties ascribed in 
provincial and national laws. 
"Municipal planning" undoubtedly has seen more growth in the post-
apartheid era than any other functional area of planning and its nuances are 
many. Accordingly, it is an accepted notion that by establishing the confines 
of "municipal planning" the parameters of the other functional areas of 
planning can more easily be ascertained.243 
5. 1. 1 The unravelling of municipal planning by the courts 
The unravelling of "municipal planning" as a concept began with an earlier 
Constitutional Court judgement, albeit indirectly. Yacoob J, in his minority 
judgment in the Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd case,244 stated 
that "municipal planning" is a local government function, but is a concurrent 
area of national and provincial legislative competence. Yacoob J did not 
expand any further on confines of the "municipal planning" function but he did 
provide an understanding of the activities undertaken by local government in 
fulfilment of its "municipal planning" functions and the instruments that guide 
such functions.245 
243 Van Wyk PERIPELJ 295; Davis J agreed with this through his statement that "It is to be expected that the powers that are vested in 
government at national level will be described in the broadest of terms, that the powers that are vested in provincial government will be 
expressed in narrower terms, and that the powers that are vested in municipalities will be expressed in the narrowest terms of all. To reason 
inferentially with the broader expression as a starting point is bound to denude the narrower expression of any meaning and by so doing to 
invert the clear constitutional intention of devolving powers on local government (my emphasis)." (Habitat Council (WCC) 17). 
244 2009 1 SA 337 (CC). 
245 Jaccob J held that that local government in exercising its "municipal planning" function must develop integrated development planning (as 
per the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000), which must incorporate SDFs setting out spatial objectives and strategies 
-. 
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It was only until the GOT (SCA) case where real clarity was provided on the 
confines of "municipal planning". The court revisited Schedules 4 and 5 of 
the Constitution and confirmed that "municipal planning" was a local 
government functional area. However, the pressing legal question was 
whether the powers exercised by local government in terms of the town 
planning ordinances also fell within the ambit of "municipal planning"? 
In order to come to a viable conclusion on the above, the court separated the 
two terms and first expanded on the term "planning". Nugent JA made 
reference to the minority judgement of Yacoob J246 and his statement that, "it 
has become commonplace throughout the English-speaking world to use the 
word 'planning' to describe the regulation and control of land use".247 Nugent 
JA proclaimed the following: 
"It is clear that the word 'planning' when used in the context of 
municipal affairs, is commonly understood to refer to the control and 
regulation of land use, and I have no doubt that it was used in the 
Constitution with that common usage in mind. The prefix 'municipal' 
does no more than confine it to municipal affairs. That construction, 
which gives meaningful effect to the term, has the effect of leaving in 
the hands of national and provincial government the authority to 
legislate in the functional area of 'urban ... development', but 
reserving to municipalities the authority to micro-manage the use of 
land for any such development." 
(para 132-135). The strategies to achieve these spatial objectives must outline desired patterns of land use, cater for the spatial 
reconstruction of a municipality, and be relevant to the location and nature of municipal development. The municipal/and use management 
system must also be guided by the SDF {para 136). 
246 Waf}' Holdings (CC) par 131. 
247 GOT (SCA) 40. 
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Consequently, the court concluded that the functions which are assigned to 
local government by the provincial ordinances fell within the ambit of 
"municipal planning" and therefore were reserved for local government.248 
The order of the SCA was submitted to the Constitutional Court for 
confirmation. This gifted the court another opportunity to confirm the SCA 
findings regarding "municipal planning" by stating: 
" .. .'planning' in the context of municipal affairs is a term which has 
assumed a particular, well-established meaning which includes the 
zoning of land and the establishment of townships. In that context, the 
term is commonly used to define the control and regulation of the use 
of land." 249 
Jafta J went on to say that the purpose of Schedule 4 and 5 are to itemise 
the powers and functions allocated to each sphere and that this should be 
read in light of the fact that our Constitution contemplates some degree of 
autonomy for each sphere.250 It was held that autonomy cannot be achieved 
if the functional areas itemised in the Schedules are interpreted in a manner 
that fails to give effect to the constitutional vision of distinct spheres of 
government. 251 
Moreover, it was stressed that the Constitution must be interpreted 
purposively, which in the context of the Schedule 4 and 5 functional areas 
means that the correct interpretation must allow for all spheres of 
government to exercise their powers "fully and effectively". 
248 GOT(SCA) para 31. 
249GDT (CC) para 57; Maccsand (WCC) 691-71E; Maccsand (SCA) para 27. 
250 Para 50 (footnotes omitted). 
251 Para 50; Davis J in the Habitat Council (WCC) judgement retterated the GOT (CC) dicta and stated that in effect this means that provincial 




The GOT judgments' set the foundation for another battle between the 
spheres of government, yet this time national government also found itself at 
the frontline in the following cases: Swart/and (WCCi52 and Maccsand 
(WCC), Maccsand (SCA), Maccsand (CC). These cases had substantially 
the same facts and legal question, namely, can mining activities commence 
without having to secure planning authorisation from the local authorities in 
accordance with LUPO? 
The Western Cape High Court in both matters granted an interdict against 
the continuation of mining. The decisions were driven by the local 
government's contention that to commence mining operations the 
appropriate land-use planning approvals needed to be secured from local 
government despite the mining companies already being in possession of 
mining rights. 
The respondents argued that mining is a national government functional area 
and managed by national legislation (the MPRDA), which in terms of section 
146 of the Constitution trumps conflicting provincial legislation (LUPO). In 
addition, the respondents argued that despite section 23(6) of the MPRDA 
stating that mining was subject to itself and any other "relevant law", the 
LUPO did not qualify as a "relevant law" in this context. The applicants253 
naturally argued the opposite successfully.254 
The SCA revisited the constitutional division of legislative and executive 
powers amongst the three spheres of government and stressed that there 
has been a move away from the hierarchical structures of the past.255 It was 
confirmed that the regulation of mining was an exclusive national legislative 
252 For a more in depth discussion of the Swart/and (WCC) matter see Patterson SAPL 692-697. 
253 The City of Cape Town: the Minister of Local Government, and the Western Cape Department of Environmental Affairs and Development 
Planning. 
254 The begrudged respondents of the court a quo decided to take the matter on appeal and due to the striking similarities both the Swartland 
and Maccsand matters were argued jointly on 16 August 2011. 
255 Para 10. 
. .. 
competence and that the administration of MPRDA vests in the DMR.256 
LUPO on the other hand is old order legislation and is considered to be 
provincial legislation for purposes of the Constitution.257 
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The court expanding on a number of municipal functions and tools, which 
included structure plans, zoning schemes, subdivision and spatial 
developments, held that because municipalities play such a central role in 
land-use planning within their jurisdiction there can be no doubt that they are 
the appropriate authorities given their knowledge of local conditions and 
intimate link with the local electret whose interests they represent.258 
The court also reiterated on the new constitutional position of municipalities 
and the subsequent powers and functions vested in them.259 Accordingly, the 
court was in agreement with the judgments of Nugent JA in GOT(SCA) 
case,260 Yacoob J in Wary Holdings (CC),261 and Jafta J in GOT (CC),262 
with regard to their respective delineations of the "municipal planning" 
concept. 263 
256 Para 14. 
257 Para 16; it is important to also note that LUPO grants powers to municipalities to regulate land-use subject to the oversight of provincial 
governments and therefore is of relevance to this section of the thesis. 
258 Para 71: The importance of this planning function had been commented on by Rogers AJ, when he stated that land use planning contrary, 
however minor the diversion, to LUPO would lead to the frustration of the very purpose of town planning and jeopardise the character of the 
area, the welfare of the members of the community, frustrate the planning objectives of the local authority {lntercape Ferreira Mainliner {Pty) 
Ltd & others v Minister of Home Affairs& others 2010 {5) SA 367 {WCC) para 105). 
259 The court held that a "municipality in the present constitutional dispensation 'is not a mere creature of statute, otherwise moribund, save if 
imbued with power by provincial or national legislation' but an organ of state that 'enjoys "original" and constitutional entrenched powers, 
functions, writes and duties that may be qualified or constrained by law and only to the extent the Constitution permits'." {Para 22 {footnotes 
omitted)). 
26o Para 41. 
261 Para 131. 
262 Para 57. 
263 Accordingly, certain arguments by Maccsand and the DMR Minister were dismissed. Namely, that a necessary component of the power 
to regulate mining is DMR's power to determine mining related land-use rights and consequently no room can be made for land-use planning 
under LUPO in respect of mining {para 29). The courts response was that when the Minister considers mining right applications the Minister 




Consequently, the court held that it cannot be said that the MPRDA provides 
a surrogate municipal planning function displacing LUP0.264 Instead the 
court held that the MPRDA and LUPO fulfil different functions and operate 
alongside one another and accordingly once a mining right or mining permit 
has been granted it will be subject to LUPO allowing that use of the land in 
question.265 In this regard it was held that dual authorisations by different 
bodies, serving different purposes, were not unknown and not objectionable 
in principle, even if this would in effect amount to one of the bodies having a 
veto.266 
The matter eventually was heard by the Constitutional Court who confirmed 
the above courts findings.267 Therefore, it is clear that mining cannot 
commence unless the land is appropriately zoned or a temporary departure 
is secured. 
Nevertheless, the mining company applied for a temporary departure and in 
the interim continued to mine. However, they were later interdicted by the 
Land Claims Court from continuing mining operations until the departure was 
secured or until the land was appropriately rezoned.268 
From the above mentioned judgements' it is clear that "municipal planning" 
includes the control and regulation of land-use. Moreover, it is clear that 
264 Para 33. 
265 Para 33. 
266 Para 34. 
267 Jafta J stated that an overlap between LUPO and the MPRDA naturally occurs due to the fact that mining is carried out on land, and such 
an overlap does not constitute an impermissible intrusion by one sphere of government into the functional area of another because the 
spheres of government do not operate in hermetically sealed compartments (para 43). Moreover, Jafta J proclaimed that LUPO regulates 
municipal/and planning and that it applies to the land which is subject to these proceedings and accordingly it cannot be assumed that the 
mere granting of a mining right cancels out the application of LUPO (para 44). Furthermore, Jafta J held reiterated that there is nothing in the 
MPRDA that suggests LUPO ceases to apply to land over which a mining right or permit has been granted, and that in facts 32(6) of the 
MPRDA states the contrast by proclaiming that a mining right "granted in terms of this Act is subject to its and other relevant laws. 
Interestingly, in this regard the court in fact made reference to the mining permit in question and that is stated that it is subject to any other 
laws (fn47). 
26a Maccassar Land Claims Committee (LCC). 
-
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local government approval for a departure or rezoning needs to be secured 
before the commencement of operations that are in contradiction to the 
zoning scheme. But, what does' control and regulation' of land-use entail? 
Davis J in the Habitat Council (WCC) judgement grouped the two concepts 
by stating that land-use control included:269 
"the control and regulation of the use of land in the municipal area and 
detailed through the zoning of land (that is, the making, amending and 
replacing of the zoning schemes, rezoning particular land, and the granting of 
departures from the provision of zoning schemes or consent uses in relation 
to particular land), as well as to the establishment of townships (that is 
controlling and regulating the consolidation, and particularly the subdivision 
of land units to create new urban areas, or for urban renewal)." 
In addition, Davis J held that municipal planning comprises forward planning. 
Municipal forward planning was held to include the, "laying down detailed 
guidelines for the future spatial development of the municipal area."270 
Accordingly, "'municipal planning" local government matters contained in 
Schedule 48 to the Constitution entails forward planning and the control of 
land-use, which includes the regulation thereof. 271 
5. 1.2 Retrospective and national implications of the Maccsand 
Judgements' 
Since the passing down of the Maccsand judgements' many questions have 
been asked regarding the retrospectively of this decision and its potential 
implication beyond the Western Cape and LUPO. 
269 Para 18. 
270Para 18. 
271 Therefore, it can be said that local government is responsible for: the development of lOPs, SDFs and land use schemes; zoning; 
rezoning; the removal of restrictions; the subdivision of land; the establishment of townships; and all applicable building restriction (Van Wyk 
2012 PERIPELJ 303). 
.. .. 
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The recent case of Mtunzini Conservancy v Tronox KZN Sands (Pty) Ltd and 
Anothe?72 provides some clarity on this matter. The Kwazulu-Natal Planning 
and Development Act273 (KZNPDA) is the current applicable land-use 
planning legislation within the relevant province. In light of the Maccsand 
judgments' the applicants sought to interdict the respondents from the 
construction of the Fairbreeze mine until they had applied for the necessary 
development approval in terms of the KZNPDA. 
However, in this case the mining authorisation was obtained under the now 
repealed Minerals Act274 which differed from the MPRDA as it contained no 
"subject to other relevant laws" provision and in fact stated that it was only 
subject to itself and to other national legislation related to the mining 
activity.275 An important point made by the court was at the time there were 
no "wall-to-wall municipalities" either.276 
The court, furthermore, expanded on the Transvaal Planning Ordinance 
(TPO). It was held that s11 of the 1992 TPO did not require provincial 
planning approval for mining and that the effect of Schedule 6 of the 
Constitution was that this situation continued until the TPO was amended.277 
The relevant "Fairbreeze properties" were not located inside a municipal area 
and were not subject to any zoning controls when the authorisation was 
granted in 1988 and this situation persisted until 2002 when the mining 
activities commenced. In light of these facts (the "trumps all" character of the 
27210629/2012 201310629 SA 2012 (KZDHC). 
273 No 6 of 2008. 
274 No 50 of 1991. 
275 Para 37. 
276 Para 38. 
277 Para 54; This amendment took place with the adoption of the KZN Town Planning Ordinance Amendment Act 3 of 2008. Notably, section 
11 (6) of the amended TPO correlates exactly with the KZNDPA s 38{3), which is "indicative of the provincial government's appreciation of the 
correct position in law when it introduced mining as an activity requiring provincial planning authorisation." (Para 56-57). 
Minerals Act and the relevant TPO at the time) the court dismissed the 
application with costs. 
68 
Although the Tronox case is merely of persuasive value in jurisdictions 
outside KwaZulu-Natal, it provides a clear reminder that each matter needs 
to be considered in it merits and that the Maccsand (CC) ruling may have 
limited retrospective effect in certain circumstances.278 
5.2 Defining the bounds of "provincial planning", "regional planning 
and development", and "urban and rural development" 
With regard to "provincial planning" a point of departure, as ascribed by the 
Constitution in Schedule 5, is that "provincial planning" is an exclusive 
provincial government competence. In Wary Holdings (CC) it was made 
clear that "provincial planning" excludes "municipal planning".279 Accordingly, 
it can be held the "municipal planning" predetermines the confines of 
"provincial planning".280 Naturally, the notion that "provincial planning" can 
be predetermined by the concept of "municipal planning" extends to other 
functional areas as well (i.e. "regional planning and development" and "urban 
and rural development"). 
In the GOT (CC) Jafta J did not find it necessary to unpack the concepts 
"regional planning and development", "urban and rural development" and 
"provincial planning". Nevertheless, as stated above the court did consider 
278 Feris J and Naidoo J summarise the implications of this judgement as follows: "the decision provides useful guidelines for approaching the 
zoning obligations of holders of old-order mining rights. In determining whether an applicant for a mining right would require consent from a 
municipal authority to conduct mining operations, it is important to consider whether the proposed mining area is situated within or outside a 
municipal area or if the municipality extended its town planning scheme to include the area in which mining is being conducted and has been 
zoned appropriately. Should a holder of an old-order mining right have conducted mining operations continuously since the granting of an old 
order mining right, the area should be zoned for mining purposes. The risk to a holder of an old order mining right that an area could have 
been zoned for purposes other than mining is, however, possible when no mining was conducted prior to the enactment of MPRDA and only 
commenced on conversion of the old order mining right." Feris J & Naidoo J (2013) "Sorting out mining in municipal areas: mining municipal 
law. Without Prejudice" 2013 (13:3) without prejudice 90. 
279 Para 127. 
2ao VanWyk 2012 PERIPELJ 302. 
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the word "planning" in isolation and in so doing, a certain amount of clarity 
was provided. It was held that the spheres of government are autonomous, 
have distinctive functions and that the context in which the term planning is 
used carries different meanings.281 The Constitution allocates different 
planning responsibilities to each sphere of government in alignment with 
what is appropriate to that specific sphere.282 The distinctiveness was held 
to lie at the level at which a particular power is exercised.283 To illustrate this, 
the court held that: 
"province exercises powers relating to 'provincial roads' whereas 
municipalities have authority over 'municipal roads' ... [t]he prefix 
attached to each functional area identifies the sphere to which it 
belongs and distinguishes it from the functional areas allocated to the 
other spheres." 284 
Jafta J provided some clarity on "urban and rural planning," albeit indirectly. 
Firstly, to lay the foundation for this discussion, Jafta J held that the 
legislative authority over Part 8 of Schedule 4 vests in the national and 
provincial spheres concurrently, while the legislative authority over Part 8 
Schedule 5 matters vests exclusively in the latter mentioned sphere.285 
Nevertheless, the national and provincial government cannot through 
legislative means assign themselves the power to exercise executive 
municipal administrative functions and powers, because these are prescribed 
to municipalities in terms of Section 156(1 )(a) of the Constitution. 
However, the respondents held that they cannot be construed to be impeding 
or compromising municipalities when they exercised the contested "municipal 
powers" because they were exercising these powers under the functional 
281 Para 53. 
282 Para 53. 
283 Para 55. 
284 Para 55. 
285 Para 59. 
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area of "urban and rural development".286 Therefore the respondents held 
that by exercising these powers, "rightly allocated to them by the 
Constitution," it cannot be deemed to be in contravention with Section 151 ( 4) 
of the Constitution.287 This submission was premised on the assumption that 
the concept "urban and rural development" ought to be given its ordinary, 
wide meaning, nevertheless, in light of the distinctive discussion above, Jafta 
J held that such a wide interpretation would be at odds with this 
Constitutional theme and approach.288 The court therefore held that in light 
of the courts duty to construe the sections of the Constitution in a manner 
that strikes harmony and gives full effect to each section, this expansive 
interpretation contended for by the respondents must be rejected. 
The court therefore did not find that the situation necessitated the giving of a 
definition for "urban and rural development"; nevertheless, it held that it was 
sufficient to say that "it is not broad enough to include powers forming part of 
'municipal planning'."289 
Fortunately, Davis J in the Habitat Council (WCC) judgment managed to 
provide some express certainty on the confines of "regional planning and 
development", "urban and rural development" and "provincial planning". As 
discussed above, Davis J concluded that "'municipal planning' comprises 
forward planning and land use control".290 However, Davis J also stated that 
inevitably, "'regional planning and development', and 'urban and rural 
development' functional areas set out in Schedule 4A to the Constitution, and 
the "provincial planning" functional area in Schedule 5A to the 
Constitution, ... constitute forward planning and land use control" as well. 291 
286 Para 60. 
287 Para 60. 
288 Para 60-61. 
289 Para 63. 
290 Para 18. 
291 Para 18-19. 
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Nevertheless, Davis J proclaimed that regional and provincial forward 
planning entail "laying down broader guidelines for areas encompassing the 
whole or parts of more than a single local or metropolitan municipality." With 
regard to the control of land use in a provincial context, Davis J held that it 
"entails provincial government taking decisions concerning zoning and the 
establishment of townships, which, because of the nature and scale of land 
use to which they relate, have substantial regional or provincial planning 
effects. "292 
5.3 Clarifying the planning domain of statutory planning authorities 
and local planning authorities 
The GOT cases involved the struggle between the City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality and the Gauteng Development Tribunal (GDT).293 
Besides the two relevant farms proposed for the township development being 
zoned as 'Agriculture', the development was inconsistent with the existing 
town planning scheme, the lOP, the SDF, and the urban edge of the 
municipality. Accordingly, the municipality opposed the developments; 
however, GOT was later approached by the developers and proceeded to 
approve the developments. 
This sparked, in August 2005, an announcement by the municipality that it 
would no longer recognise planning approvals granted by the GOT. A 
simultaneous application was brought to the South Gauteng High Court.294 
The applicants (the municipality) wanted a declaratory order on the exact 
powers the GOT had in terms of the DFA to approve the establishment of 
townships and to amend existing town planning schemes. Furthermore, the 
applicants requested that the abovementioned approvals be reviewed and 
292 Para 19. 
293 The GOT is a provincial statutory body given certain decision making authority over planning by the DFA. 
294 At the time of this application the court was still the Witwatersrand High Court. 
set aside and that the developers be interdicted from proceeding with their 
respective development projects. 
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Gildenhuys J found that the DFA procedures could be used alternatively to 
those set out in the provincial ordinances and that the 'provincial ordinances' 
and the DFA operated as parallellegislation.295 
Unsatisfied by the above decision the municipality approached the SCA.296 
The pressing legal question was the constitutionality of both chapters V and 
VI of the DFA.297 The SCA ruled that allowing two different bodies to speak 
on the same subject with different voices, could only lead to the disruption of 
orderly planning and development within the "municipal planning" regime. 298 
Accordingly, Chapters V and VI of the DFA were declared invalid in their 
entirety but the declaration of invalidity was suspended for 18 months to 
enable Parliament to remedy the defects identified by the Court.299 
When the matter was submitted to the Constitutional Court for confirmation, 
the court confirmed the unconstitutionality of the above chapters. However, 
the court suspended the order of invalidity for 24 months to avoid and 
disruptive effect that the invalidity order might have. Furthermore, the 
development tribunals were prohibited from hearing any further matters in the 
City's jurisdiction and in the jurisdiction of the eThekwini Municipality, except 
for those already pending matters. 
295 Unfortunately, this decision was heavily influenced by the wording of literature on the land development procedures of the DFA, which 
stated that the DFA "will operate in parallel to and as alternative for existing land development procedures" (Budlender et al Juta's new land 
/aw2A-3). 
296 GOT (SCA). 
297 Para 4. 
29a GOT (SCA) para 1. 
299 The reasoning behind this suspension was to prevent those local authorities with capacity constraints from immediately being burdened 
with a flurry of development applications. 
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5.4 Resolving conflicts between environmental mandates and 
planning mandates 
In Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-Genera/: 
Environmental Management, Department of Agriculture, Conservation and 
Environment, Mpuma/anga Province and Others300 the Constitutional Court 
found that when the local authorities considered the need and desirability of 
a development they did so from a planning law perspective and when the 
environmental authorities (provincial government) decided on same they 
would take into account socio-economic, economic and environmental 
considerations (the principles of sustainability). 
The Lagoon Bay (WCC) ruling served to further complicated and confused 
concepts that seemed to have been cleared up by the Constitutional Court by 
failing to take the above matter into account. Instead the court accepted that 
the test to determine need and desirability is a policy driven test and 
authorities have a broad discretion on what factors to take into account. 
Therefore, this ruling appears to be in direct conflict to the narrow 
interpretation adopted by the Constitutional Court in the Fuel Retailers 
judgment. 
The Lagoon Bay matter did eventually end up at the doors of the 
Constitutional Court.301 The court provided some clarity on the ambit of the 
Minister's decision-making authority under LUPO. The court held that the 
Minister was entitled to take account of factors such as the 'preservation of 
the natural and developed environment' when exercising the power in 
question." 
In coming to this decision, the Constitutional Court aptly made reference to 
the Fuel Retailers (CC) judgment and reiterated that:302 
30o 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC). 
301 See Cullinan & Associates Legalbrief Environmental 26 November 2013 for a further discussion on the decision of the Constitutional Court. 
302 Para 64. 
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"It is no answer by the environmental authorities to say that had they 
themselves considered the need and desirability aspect, this could 
have led to conflicting decisions between the environmental officials 
and the town-planning officials [who had also considered desirability]. 
If that is the natural consequence of the discharge of their obligations 
under the environmental legislation, it is a consequence mandated by 
the statute. It is impermissible for them to seek to avoid this 
consequence by delegating their obligations to the town-planning 
authorities." 
Accordingly, the court held that it is possible that different decision-makers 
may consider some of the same factors during different approval 
processes.303 Therefore, for example, when a decision maker is evaluating a 
rezoning application, they may have regard to considerations such as 
" ... safety and welfare ... of the community and 'the preservation of the 
natural and developed environment', within the context of his or her broad 
discretion to determine 'desirability'."304 
As a result the court held that a decision-maker, when considering an 
application for an environmental authorisation, must "have regard to various 
principles to ensure socially, environmentally and economically sustainable 
development, including avoiding environmental degradation, preserving 
cultural heritage, the responsible and equitable use of natural resources, 
community well-being and empowerment and the beneficial use of 
environmental resources for the service of the public interest."305 
Therefore, the court held that "it seems that it is clear that environmental 
authorities and planning authorities may ... consider some of the same 
factors when granting their respective authorisations." 306 However, the 
court held that this cannot detract from their statutory obligations to consider 
303 Para 65. 
304 Para 65. 
305 Para 65 (footnote omitted). 
306 Para 65. 
those factors, and indeed to reach their own conclusions in relation 
thereto."307 
75 
Accordingly, the court ruled that Lagoon Bay "had failed to show that, to the 
extent that the Provincial Minister may have ignored or revisited some of the 
conclusions reached during the earlier approval processes, he improperly or 
unlawfully exercised his discretion in terms of section 36 of LUP0."308 
5.4. 1 Local authorities legislative powers over the environmental 
sphere 
It has already been said that that "environment" is listed in Schedule 4A of 
the Constitution and is therefore a functional area of concurrent national and 
provincial legislative competence. However, local governments are also 
charged with the obligation of providing a healthy environment to their 
populace. 
The question is what is the ambit of the municipality's powers in as far as it 
concerns nature conservation through the use of spatial planning 
instrumentation? This exact question was taken on in the Le Sueur 
(ZAKZPHC) judgement handed down on 30 January 2013, where the court 
considered whether local government had acted ultra vires its powers by 
legislating in the sphere of the environment.309 
:>JJ? Para 65 (footnote omitted). 
:>J.Ja Para 66. 
:>!J9 Dagut & Chien provide an succinct summarised the matter as follows: ".The Durban Metropolitan Open Space System (D-MOSS) (initially 
known as the eThekwini Environmental Services Management Plan) was introduced as a policy directive of the Municipal Council. It created 
a system of open spaces of land and water, consisting of areas of high biodiversity. As directives do not have the same legislative weight as 
a town-planning scheme, it was difficult for the First Respondent (the eThekwini Municipality) to enforceD-MOSS. Although landowners 
would undertake work on their properties in accordance with its zoning provisions, they were often ignorant of the provisions of D-MOSS. 
In order to improve enforcement and certainty, the First Respondent passed a resolution in 2010 to integrateD-MOSS into its town-planning 
schemes. Essentially, D-MOSS would overlay the underlying zoning and create controlled areas. Developments within the controlled areas 
would require environmental authorisation or support from the Environmental Planning & Climate Protection Department of the eThekwini 
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The applicant argued because "environment" is listed in Schedule 4, Part A 
of the Constitution it excludes Municipalities at Local Government level from 
such area of activity. 310 The municipality conversely argued that Section 
156(4) of the Constitution indicates that even matters reserved for National 
and Provincial legislative authority in Parts A of Schedules 4 and 5 may be 
dealt with at a municipallevel.311 In addition, Section 156(5) provides that "a 
Municipality has the right to exercise any power concerning a matter 
reasonably necessary for or incidental to, the effective performance of its 
functions." 
The respondents took the point that "although matters relating to the 
environment may be said, in terms of the Constitution, to be the primary 
concern or sphere of National and Provincial responsibility that Local 
Governments in the form of Municipalities are in the best position to know, 
understand, and deal with issues involving the environment at the local 
level."312 The court agreed with the respondent's view that "the framers of 
the Constitution did not intend thereby to allocate legislative powers amongst 
the three spheres of Government in hermetically sealed, distinct and water 
tight compartments."313 
The court therefore concluded that "the environment is an ideal example of 
an area of legislative and executive authority or power which had to reside in 
Municipality, regardless of their underlying zoning." (Dagut & Chien "Court confirms that municipalities may regulate on environmental 
matters too" 2013 Environment http:liwww.withoutpreiudice.co.zalindex.ohplissues/categoo12013125 para 3-5). 
310 Para 16; This section states that National Government and Provincial Governments must assign to a Municipality, by agreement and 
subject to any conditions, the administration of a matter listed in Part A of Schedule 4, or Part A of Schedule 5 which necessarily relates to 
Local Government, if: (i) the matter would most effectively be administered locally; and (ii) the Municipality has the capacity to administer it. 
311 This section states that National Government and Provincial Governments must assign to a Municipality, by agreement and subject to any 
conditions, the administration of a matter listed in Part A of Schedule 4, or Part A of Schedule 5 which necessarily relates to Local 
Government, if: (i) the matter would most effectively be administered locally; and (ii) the Municipality has the capacity to administer it. 
312 Para 20. 
313 Para 20; in coming to this conclusion the court referred to section 40 and 43 of the Constitution. 
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all three levels of Government and, therefore, could not be inserted in Parts 
8 of Schedules 4 and 5 and was instead inserted in Part A of Schedule 4."314 
5.5 Drawing a line between "provincial planning mandates" and 
"local planning mandates" 
5.5.1 Intervention and supervision by provincial government in local 
government affairs 
It has been repeated above that "the constitutional scheme propels one 
ineluctably to the conclusion that, barring functional areas of concurrent 
competence, each sphere of government is allocated separate and distinct 
powers which it alone is entitled to exercise."315 However, it is also 
recognised that the "constitutionally mandated intervention in terms of 
Section 1 OO ... and 139 ... constitute an exception to the principle and limited 
autonomy of the spheres of government." 316 
However, it must be noted that intervention in local government matters in 
accordance with Section 139 of the Constitution should only take place when 
local government, "cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation in terms 
of the Constitution or legislation".317 
Moreover, provincial government in terms of Section 125(3), 154(1) and 
156(6) of the Constitution must support local government to help develop 
31 4 Para 20; in order to support this argument the court made reference to the Warey Holdings (CC) judgement where the court held that: 
"There is no reason why the two spheres of control cannot co-exist even if they overlap and even if, in respect of the approval of sub-division 
of 'Agricultural Land' the one may in effect veto the decision of the other. It should be borne in mind that the one sphere of control operates 
from a municipal perspective and the other from a national perspective. Each having its' own constitutional and policy considerations." (para 
20). In addition, the court in paragraph 20 made reference to the Maccsand (CC) decision and the comments that: "The Constitution allocates 
powers to three spheres of Government in accordance with the functional vision of what is appropriate to each sphere. But because these 
powers are not contained hermetically sealed compartments, sometimes the exercise of powers by two spheres may result in an overlap. 
When this happens, neither sphere is intruding into the functional area of another. Each sphere would be exercising power within its own 
competence. It is in this context that the Constitution obliges these spheres of Government to co-operate with one another in mutual trust and 
good faith, and to co-ordinate the actions taken with one another." (para 47). 
315 GOT (CC) para 56. 
316 GOT (CC) para 56. 
317 s 139(1). 
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their capacities to a point that will allow them to perform their designated and 
assigned functions. 
The Lagoon Bay (WCC) case confirmed that the above powers may be 
misused or be subject to misinterpretation.318 The applicants attacked the 
decision by the first Provincial Minister (MEC) on the grounds that the 
condition imposed by the MEC to allow his successor to revisit a local 
government planning decision was ultra vires the empowering provisions of 
LUPO and constitutionally unlawful in regards to its effect on s 156 (1 ), read 
with Part 8 of Schedule 4.319 
The court dismissed the former argument and held that LUP0320 authorises 
the Minister when granting an application to do so subject to conditions that 
they may deem fit. In regard to the constitutional argument the applicants 
referred to the GOT (CC) case. As stated above in the GOT judgment 
"municipal planning" was interpreted to encompass the control and regulation 
of the use of land, including the zoning of land and the establishment of 
townships. In short, it was concluded that zoning of land is an exclusive 
municipal competence. 
Nevertheless, the court held that the above matter was distinguishable from 
the Lagoon Bay case, for it dealt with an Act that created tribunals "as 
separate bodies with "parallel authority", and purported to confer equivalent 
authority on such tribunals to deal with matters falling within the functional 
area of 'municipal planning'."321 This was juxtaposed with the "complex"322 
318 The applicant (LagoonBay) wished to develop the Lagoon Bay Lifestyle Estate. Application was made to the Minister for the amendment 
of a structure plan from "agriculture/ forestry" to township development. This was duly authorised by the Minister but on a condition. The 
condition was that when an application was submitted for rezoning and subdivision to the local authorities, the decision would have to be 
referred back to the Minister for his consideration. The local authorities approved the application and accordingly referred it to the present 
Minister for the necessary further attention. The Minster's decision was to overturn the local authority's approval. 
319 Para 6. 
320 s 42(1). 
321 Para 11. 
322 Para 12. 
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consideration that the court was faced with in Lagoon Bay, namely the 
constitutional relationship between provincial government and municipalities. 
The court held it was the above constitutional relationship that distinguished 
the two matters and that the Constitution entrusts the provinces with 
extensive powers with regard to the monitoring and support over local 
government. Furthermore, the court stated that the Constitution in s 139(1) 
provides that provincial government has the power to directly intervene 
"when a municipality cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation in terms 
of the Constitution or legislation.323 
Before going any further it is necessary to discuss the above dicta in 
isolation. The court mentions all the provisions that allow for an intervention 
by provincial government into local government competencies, however, it 
fails to sufficiently focus on the underlying events that would lawfully 
necessitate such intervention. For example, had the municipality failed or 
was there a possibility that it would fail to fulfil its executive duties? There 
was no evidence put forth to allow this question to be answered in the 
affirmative. This being said, it can be confirmed despite "the functional areas 
allocated to the various spheres of government. .. not [being] contained in 
hermetically sealed compartments",324 the interference by one sphere in the 
competencies of another cannot occur unless it does so within the 
parameters of the Constitution. In this case it seemed that those parameters, 
were breached. 
However, Lagoon Bay had not directly challenged the constitutionality of 
Section 16 and section 25 of LUPO and the court therefore held that the 
MEC was allowed to consider the application for rezoning and subdivision. 
The reason being, Sections 16 and 25 of LUPO, allowed the MEC to approve 
such applications. In addition, the court held that these sections are not 
323 Para 12. 
324 GOT (CC) para 55. 
•• 
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repugnant to the Constitution and therefore have neither been, by way of 
implication, repealed nor amended.325 
Lagoon Bay took the above mater on appeal to the SCA and the matter was 
heard 25 February 2013. The Lagoon Bay (SCA) judgement was decided on 
15 March 2013 and the court overturned the court a quo's decision. The 
SCA held that: 
"In terms of LUPO, the principal tools for the regulation of land use are 
through the introduction and enforcement of structure plans at a 
regional level and zoning schemes at a municipal level. The general 
purpose of a structure plan is to lay down guidelines for the future 
spatial development of the area to which it relates in such a way as 
will most effectively promote the order of the area and the general 
welfare of the community concerned (s 5). And the general purpose of 
a zoning scheme is to determine use rights and to provide for control 
over use rights and over the utilisation of the land in the area of 
jurisdiction of a local authority (s 11 )."326 
Therefore, the court held that "while a comprehensive land-use regime calls 
for integrated and co-ordinated interaction on the part of provincial and 
municipal government, it goes without saying that the one may not usurp the 
powers of the other."327 The court held that the MEC was able to consider 
the application to amend the structure plan but was not able to consider the 
rezoning application and declared the municipality the competent authority to 
315 Para 16-18. 
316 Para 11. 
317 Para 11. 
consider and determine the applicant's application for rezoning and 
subdivision. 328 
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The MEC begrudged by the above decision took the matter to the 
Constitutional Court. The Lagoon Bay (CC) matter reiterated the findings of 
the court of first instance that Section 16 and 25 of LUPO remain in force as 
old-order legislation remains in force until the necessary steps are taken to 
have it set aside.329 In this regard the court held that even if it was accepted 
that the legislative provisions may be impliedly amended or repealed, there is 
no obvious and direct contradiction between those broad phrases in the 
Constitution (i.e. "provincial planning", "municipal planning" and "regional 
planning and development"). 330 
In addition, the court held that the structure plan that had been amended in 
1988 to allow for the municipality to consider all rezoning applications was 
subject to a qualification in the amendment that stated that this delegation of 
power will not be applicable where a state institution (i.e. provincial 
government) was not in favour of the rezoning. 331 Therefore, the court held 
that Lagoon Bay's challenge to the rezoning refusal as being ultra vires 
LUPO must fail; however, the court emphasised that this in no way implies 
that the MEC was competent under the Constitution to exercise rezoning 
functions, but this finding is limited to a rejection of Lagoon Bay's argument 
that the impugned decision was ultra vires LUP0.332 
With regard to the MECs to decide upon subdivision applications, the court 
held that unlike the structure plan amendment, the Scheme Regulations do 
not qualify a local authority's power to decide subdivision applications, nor 
limit its competence to instances when there is no disagreement from the 
328 Para 12; it is important to note that the SCA did not deal with the MEG's powers under LUPO, but relied on the provisions of the 
Constitution regarding the division of functions and competences between spheres of government. as well as the interpretation of those 
provisions by court in GOT (SCA). 
329 Para 26. 
330 Para 27. 
331 Para 51. 
332 Para 52. 
• . 
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MEC.333 The court held that while the amendment authorises MECs to make 
subdivision decisions, it only grants that authorisation if a municipality has 
elected not to decide the subdivision application itself. In the present case 
the municipality elected to decide the subdivision and therefore the MEC was 
acting ultra vires when deciding the application. 
The above decision has been viewed as an opportunity missed for the court 
to further build on the GOT cases and subsequently further clarify the ambit 
of the municipal and provincial planning competences in the Constitution.334 
Fortunately, Davis J in the Habitat Council (WCC) judgement provided some 
guidance on the provincial intervention. Davis J held that: 
"provincial government may enact, maintain in force and enforce 
legislation and take and implement executive decisions which regulate 
or broadly manage or control the exercise by municipalities over the 
executive authority in relation to municipal planning."335 
This approach was held to promote the aim, enshrined in section 155(7) of 
the Constitution, of "ensuring effective performance by municipalities of the 
functions which they have been granted under the rubric of municipal 
planning,"336 as well as to promote "the development of their capacity to 
perform their functions and manage their own affairs" as per section 
155(6)(b) of the Constitution. 
Accordingly, Davis J ruled that "provincial government may regulate the 
manner in which municipalities exercise their executive authority, which 
333 Para 53. 
334 Cullinan & Associates 2013 Legalbrief Environmental. 
335 Para 20. 
336 Para 20. 
. . 
entails a 'broad managing or controlling rather than a direct authorisation 
function' ."337 
In light of the above, Davis J held that in the context of the case in casu: 338 
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"provincial government may also assess the outcome of the municipal 
planning processes. Provincial government may require that the 
decision be reconsidered by a municipality if the manner in which it 
was taken, the justification for the decision, or the nature and effect, or 
likely effect of the decision undermines the effective performance by 
the municipality of its forward planning and land use control functions." 
It was held that such an approach "harmonises the relationship between the 
two levels of government, rather than being destructive of local government 
powers and their conflation with provincial powers. "339 
From the above it can be deduced that provincial government should not 
interfere in intra-municipal planning matters that do not affect provincial 
interests. However, in the Habitat Council (WCC) decision it was held that 
this does not mean that provincial government "cannot make provision for 
and consider appeals aimed at ensuring the effective performance by 
municipalities of their municipal planning competences."340 
Nevertheless, the court held that Section 44 of LUPO was "manifestly 
inconsistent with the Constitution to the extent that it not only permits appeals 
to the Province against every decision made by a municipality in terms of 
LUPO, and also because it allows first respondent to replace every decision 
with his own decision, even where the development in question patently 
affects only 'municipal planning'."341 
337 Para 20 (footnote omitted). 
338 Para 21. 
339 Para21. 
34° Para 23. 
341 Para 28. 
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5.5.2 Extra-municipal issues 
The MEC's council in the Lagoon Bay (WCC) matter emphasised that "there 
is a category of planning decisions which will have an impact beyond the 
area of a single municipality"342 and that "these 'extra-municipal' issues ... 
exceed the bounds of municipal planning and fall within the ambit of 'regional 
planning and development' ... and/or 'provincial planning' ."343 It was argued 
and accepted that this particular development fell within this extra-municipal 
category. Whether this submission was one of merit cannot be confirmed as 
the court seemed to ignore this point and provided no clarity on what 
constitutes "provincial planning" or "regional planning and development". A 
three-stage enquiry starting by: defining both concepts; determining the 
conflict; and lastly how to resolve the conflict would have been the preferable 
approach.344 This in turn can only be viewed as a missed opportunity to 
provide for some much needed legal clarity. 
Davis J in the Habitat Council (WCC) decision fortunately provided some 
guidance in this regard. Davis J held stated that it is only apt for province to 
take a decision, concerning zoning and township establishment, if the nature 
and scale of land use to which they relate, have substantial regional or 
provincial planning effects.345 Therefore, Davis J held that: 
342 Para 10. 
343 Para 10. 
"When exercising this power, the provincial government must confine 
itself to the regional provincial effects; that is it is not at large to reject 
a proposal because it approves of a feature which has only intra-
municipal effects. Recall Nugent JA's dicta in the GOT case at 
paragraphs [35]-[37], namely, that the enquiry commences with an 
examination of the narrowest form of power, and moves upwards, 
344 Patterson 2012 Land use planning. 
345 Para 19. 
rather than the other way round. This approach permits a clear 
demarcation between municipal and provincial government." 
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Davis J also expressed that the very purpose of forward planning and land 
use control under "municipal planning", "regional planning and development", 
"urban and rural development", and "provincial planning" "exist to promote 
order of the area, whether it be the municipal area, the region or the 
province, and the general welfare of the community concerned through a 
coordinated and harmonious development of the area."346 
5.5.3 Provincial government basing decisions on "municipal 
planning"- a false dichotomy 
The setting of this discussion, akin to the Lagoon Bay and Habitat Council 
judgements, is once again the Western Cape However, this time we find 
ourselves in the beautiful garden route area. The applicable case law:: 
She/fplett (WCC), Clairison's (WCC) and Clairison's (SCA). 
In the Shelfplett (WCC)347 matter the main point of departure was that for the 
development to go ahead the KWP RSP would have to be amended by the 
MEC to allow for the rezoning and subdivision approval from the Bitou 
Municipality. The legal question was: had the MEC in coming to his decision 
wrongly taken into account "municipal planning" considerations? 
346 Para 20. 
347 Shelfplett was the owner of a property, located in the Plettenberg Bay area, which they wanted to develop. The property was designated 
"recreation" in accordance with the Knysna- Wilderness- Plettenberg Bay Regional Structure Plan (KWP RSP). Accordingly, an application 
was made to the MEC to change the designation to 'Township Development', however, the MEC rejected the application. As a result of the 
above refusal the Shelfplett, with the support of the Bitou Municipality, approached the High Court for the review and setting aside of the 
decision and moreover for the RSP to be declared invalid. The High Court declared the RSP invalid in that the relevant map guiding the RSP 
was "informed by discriminatory laws and had a racial character." (para 46) This in effect rendered moot the review of the MEG's decision, 
however, Rogers J, in a great service to legal certainty, looked into the remaining ground of review. 
-. 
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In answering the above, the court thought it necessary to revisit the MEC's 
reasons for his decision, which included the following: 348 
(a) where the local authorities has failed to draw up urban edges as 
obligated by the WC SDF the MEC has to determine a suitable urban 
edge ensuring room for future development while attaining higher 
densities; (b) the existence of a golf estate and polo estate in the area 
does not justify shifting the urban edge; (c) given the exceptionally 
attractive landscape present to the north a township development in 
that direction was undesirable; (d) the development would put added 
pressure on the N2; (e) employees of the proposed development 
would have to travel substantial distances , which conflict with the 
aims of WC SDF's; (f) the Bitou Municipality would potentially be 
burdened in providing services and infrastructure. 
Shelfplett argued that the 1991 PPA must be interpreted in a manner that 
would align it with the provisions of the Constitution, which has reserved local 
government as the sphere to deal with "municipal planning" responsibilities. 
Moreover, Shelfplett held that even if only a few of the considerations taken 
into account by the MEC were influenced by "municipal planning", they would 
still constitute impermissible considerations, sufficient to invalidate his 
decision.349 
Counsel for the MEC agreed that if any of the considerations were "municipal 
planning" rather than "provincial planning" functions that the MEC's decision 
would have to be set aside. However, the MEC's argument was that this 
decision had implications beyond the boundaries of one municipality and 
may have implications for the concurrent functional areas of national and 
provincial competence. 350 
348 Para 82. 
349 Para 87. 




However, Rogers J did not agree with the above contention put forth by 
counsel and said that you have to look at the empowering legislation in order 
to determine the considerations the MEC was entitled to reflect upon.351 The 
court held that it could not have been intended by the legislature to install 
certain powers on the MEC and then prevent the MEC from taking into 
account considerations instrumental to exercising those powers.352 
Accordingly, it was held that If the legislative scheme for RSPs is a provincial 
planning matter, which Rogers J submitted it was, then "all the 
considerations which the legislation authorises the relevant authority to take 
into account in approving or amending an RSP are permissible provincial 
planning considerations."353 On this point Rogers J explained that a false 
dichotomy has been assumed between the function entrusted to an authority 
and the considerations that may be taken into account in executing that 
function.354 Rogers J distinguished the facts that lay before the 
Constitutional Court in the GOT case and the facts at hand. In the GOT 
case: 
"it was the function (the granting of rezonings and subdivision 
approvals) that was investigated and held to be a 'municipal planning' 
function. For this reason it was held to have been constitutionally 
impermissible for the OF Act to allocate the performance of such 
functions to provincial tribunals. Once one finds that the function of 
approving rezonings and subdivisions is a municipal planning function, 
all the considerations that the governing legislation authorises a 
municipality to take into account in deciding rezoning applications and 
subdivision applications may be taken into account. They are ex 
hypothesi valid municipal planning considerations for purposes of the 
function under consideration. There is in truth no point in labelling the 
351 Para 90. 
352 Para 1 00. 
353 Para 113. 
354 Para 113. 
considerations -they take their character from the function to which 
they relate." 
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In light of the above, the relevant function in this case is the approval or 
amendment of the RSP and the decision in this regard was a "provincial 
planning" function. Accordingly, the same inference can apply, namely that 
the consideration that the MEC is empowered to take into account by 
legislation are ex hypotheis "provincial planning" considerations for the 
purposes of that particular function. Naturally, from this reasoning in 
deciding to amend an RSP the MEC could have regard to considerations 
such as containing urban sprawl, densifying existing areas of urban 
development. The reason being, that "the MEC was authorised by the 1991 
PPA and Section 29(3) of the DFA to base his decision on these 
considerations he did, even if some or all of them were matters of 'municipal 
planning'."355 
The Clairison's (WCC) case was similar to the above as it also involved a 
property within the KWP area, which was owned by Clairison's CC who 
wished to develop the property. Once again the question was whether the 
MEC could take into account "municipal planning" considerations (or, put 
differently, the spatial context of the applicant's land) in reaching his 
decision?356 However, this time the matter involved an application for the 
judicial review of the MEC's decision to dismiss an internal appeal against 
the MEC's refusal to grant environmental authorisation for the development. 
Cloete J referred to the Shelfplett judgment and stated that the same logic 
surrounding the empowering legislation and the above false dichotomy must 
prevail.357 First, the MEC in terms of Section 35(4) of the ECA was obliged to 
consider whether to grant or refuse the applicant's appeal. Secondly, if not 
355 Para 103. 
356 Para 56. 
357 Para 61. 
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empowered to give consideration to the spatial context of the applicant's land 
in relation to environmental factors how was the MEC supposed to have 
exercised the very power conferred upon him by the ECA.358 Once again 
the function and the considerations have to be separated and because this 
was clearly a "provincial planning" function the MEC taking into account 
"considerations which the municipality could or should take into account 
when deciding on municipal planning issues, does not preclude another 
sphere of government (in casu the MEC) from taking into account the very 
considerations in the exercise of its functions."359 
Nevertheless, the court did find that the decision to dismiss the internal 
appeal should be set aside as the MEC had failed to take into account 
relevant considerations, when making his decision and that Clairisons CC 
had reasonable grounds for apprehending that the MEC was biased.360 
One of the key relevant factors that the MEC had failed to take into account 
included the existing Municipality's delineated wide urban edge. The court 
held that the MEC should have taken the municipal urban edge into account, 
irrespective of whether the MEC regarded that delineation as having been 
rationally and lawfully determined, because there had over the past six years 
been developments that proceeded in accordance with the wide urban edge. 
Secondly, it was held that the MEC could not, simply based on his 
disagreement with the decision, ignore his predecessor's decision to grant an 
amendment to the structure plan. 
However, the matter was taken on appeal to the SCA. In the Clairison (SCA) 
judgement Nugent JA set-aside the findings of the court a quo and held that 
the evidence in fact alluded to the fact that "the MEC pertinently took account 
of each of the factors [and that] the application was refused precisely 
358 Para 61. 
359 Para 61. 
360 Both these reasons are grounds for a review in accordance with s 6(2)(e)(iii). 
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because he took them into account."361 Nugent JA stated that in fact the true 
compliant of Clairsons in the court a quoa was that the MEC attached no 
weight to one of the factors, and in the other cases he weighed them against 
granting the application, whereas Clairisons contends that they ought to have 
weighed in favour of granting it. 
The Nugent JA held that the court a quo had blurred the lines between 
appeal and review. 362 Nugent JA held that: 
"a review is not concerned with the correctness of a decision made by 
a functionary, but with whether he performed the function with which 
he was entrusted. When the law entrusts a functionary with a 
discretion it means just that: the law gives recognition to the 
evaluation made by the functionary to whom the discretion is 
entrusted, and it is not open to a court to second-guess his 
evaluation." 
Hence, Nugent JA held that there has been no suggestion that the avoidance 
of urban sprawl was not a legitimate environmental concern upon which the 
MEC was entitled to found his decision on. 
5.6 Providing clarity on the form, nature and status of planning tools 
(particularly provincial structure plans, SDF, lOPs and structure plans) 
In Shelfplett (WCC) the court first set the foundation for the above arguments 
by analysing the applicable legal instruments and the origins of RSPs. Under 
the 1967 PPA the relevant national Minister could develop "guide plans", 
which guided the future spatial of a development of a particular defined area. 
The legal status of these guide plans was such that any local town planning 
schemes could be amended or introduced if in the opinion of the Minister it 
361 Para 17. 
362 Para 18. 
would result in inconsistencies with the guide plan.363 The KWP RSP was 
approved as a guide plan in September 1982.364 
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The 1991 PPA repealed the relevant provisions of the 1967 PPA, however, in 
terms of Section 37(1) of the 1991 PPA guide plans continue in force as if 
unabated by the repeal. Nevertheless, in terms of Section 37(2)(a) of the 
1991 PPA the Minister may declare such a guide plan a RSP. RSPs fulfil a 
very similar role under the 1991 PPA as guide plans did under the 1967 
Act.365 Accordingly, on 9 February 1996 the former KWP guide plan was 
declared a RSP under the 1991 PPA, and therefore incorporated within the 
ambit of the 1991 PPA. 
An important point covered was that the administration of the PPA had not 
been assigned to province, "whether by design or oversight", and therefore 
the President was in fact the planning authority.366 However, it was argued 
and accepted that due to Section 29(3) of the DFA367 the MEC was 
nevertheless allowed to decide on the matter.368 Rogers J confirmed that the 
DFA was an independent source of power and therefore neither the 
procedure nor the criteria for amendment in Section 19 of the 1991 PPA are 
applicable.369 In light of Section 2 of the DFA, the power of amendment 
under Section 29(3) should be exercised in accordance with the land 
development specified in Section 3(1) of the DFA.370 
In terms of LUPO the "Administrator", namely the MEC, was empowered to 
make scheme regulations and the relevant scheme in question had 
designated Shelfpetts property as Agriculture F.371 LUPO states that 
363 S 6A(12); para 8 of the Shelfplett judgment. 
364 Para 9. 
365 Para 12. 
366 Para 15. 
367 This section was unaffected by the GOT (CC) case as it falls outside of chapters V and VI. 
368 Para 16. 
369 Para 17. 
370 Para 17. 
371 Para 18. 
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rezoning and subdivision applications may be made and granted by local 
government, and that the decision will be subject to an appeal by the MEC in 
terms of Section 44.372 
The Municipal Systems Act in Section 35(1 )(a) states that a duly adopted 
IDP is the "principal strategic planning instrument which guides and informs 
all planning and development, and all decisions with regard to planning, 
management and development, in the municipality". 373 Moreover, Section 
35(2) states that a SDF forming part of the IDP prevails over a "plan" as 
defined in section 1 of the 1991 PPA. Consequently the implications are that 
an approved lOP's SDF would prevail over an RSP for the same area.374 
In December 2005 various provincial planning policies, including the 
Provincial Urban Edge Guideline and golf estate and resort development 
approval guidelines, were approved by the Western Cape Provincial 
Government (WCPG).375 As per these guidelines an urban edge is defined 
as a line drawn around an urban area, forming a growth boundary to limit 
urban sprawl. LUPO allows both local authorities and provincial authorities 
to prepare structure plans. In terms of Section 36(1) of LUPO rezoning and 
subdivision applications can only be refused on limited grounds, notably this 
includes if the contemplated land use is undesirable.376 On 24 June 2009 the 
Western Cape Provincial Spatial Development Framework (WC SDF) was 
approved as a structure plan and required each municipality in development 
preparations for their respective SDFs, to determine medium term urban 
edges. 377 There was dispute as to whether the Bitou municipality had 
372 Para 18-19. 
373 Para 22. 
374 Para 22; The court did revisit whether the Bitou Municipality had a duly adopted lOP, however, this is beyond the scope of this thesis and 
the discussion will end here. 
375 Para 24. 
376 Para 26. 
377 Para 27. 
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provided for such an urban edge and, if they had not, the urban edge would 
be determined by the de facto limit of urban development. 
Consequently, Rogers J provided some much needed guidance on the 
different planning tools and their interaction with one another. 
5.7 Conclusions 
The courts have made a valiant effort in providing some much needed legal 
certainty to the planning law regime. This includes the unravelling of the 
"municipal planning" function in the GOT and Maccsand judgements. In the 
latter series of judgements the court also provided guidance on the 
relationship between the MPRDA and LUPO. However, the implications of 
this judgement were qualified by the Tronox case. 
Although the confines of "provincial planning", "regional planning and 
development" and "urban and rural development" were only given indirect 
attention in the War Holdings and GOT cases; Davis J in the Habitat Council 
matter provided some clear guidance in this regard. 
The GOT case clarified that a statutory authority cannot be given "municipal 
planning" powers and operate in parallel with local government. 
Although the Lagoon Bay (WCC) judgement initially befuddled the Fuel 
Retailers (CC) judgement, with regard to resolving conflicts between 
environmental mandates and planning mandates, the Lagoon Bay (CC) 
decision rescued the situation. Therefore, it is now understood that planning 
and environmental authorities when considering the need and desirability of 
a project, do so through a different lens. The Le Sueur judgement also 
provided that local government can legislate on environmental matters and 
provided guidance on how such powers should be exercised. 
The courts have further provided a degree of certainty concerning provincial 
governments' powers to decide on extra municipal issues and where to draw 
the line in this regard. The court in the Habitat Council case provided some 
much needed legal certainty on the decision-making authorities of all spheres 
of government. In addition, the courts' in Shelfplett (WCC), Clairison's 
(WCC) and C/airison's (SCA) provided an indication on when provincial 
government may take "municipal planning" considerations into in their 
decision making processes. 
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However, the fact that Lagoon Bay did not directly challenge the 
constitutionality of LUPO, it must be held that this was a missed opportunity 
for the highest court in the land to provide further certainty on provincial 
government support and intervention of local government. In addition, it is 
unfortunate that the Court in Lagoon Bay did not highlight the applicability 
and relevance of other pieces of legislation, such as SALA, to the matter at 
hand.378 
It is therefore evident that there is still room for legislative intervention to fill 
these gaps of uncertainty. In the next chapter it will be considered the 
degree to which SPLUMA is able to do so. 
378 Olivier & Williams 2013 Journal for Juridical Science 130. 
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6 Chapter 6: Legislative attempt at legal certainty- SPLUMA 
6.1 Introduction 
SPLUMA was promulgated on 05 August 2013; however, the 
commencement thereof has been postponed pending the development of 
Regulations379 needed to give effect to the Act and assumingly to give 
provincial and local government time to draft their respective planning Acts 
and by-laws. SPLUMA provides for the repeal of a host of planning laws 
that, as outlined above, provided for a fragmented planning regime that 
was unable to address South Africa's planning needs.380 
SPLUMA introduces provisions to cater for: development principles; norms 
and standards; inter-governmental support; SDFs across national, 
provincial, regional and municipal scales; land use schemes; municipal 
planning tribunals; applications affecting national interest. This Chapter 
looks at these provisions and whether they provide sufficient clarity 
regarding planning mandates in line with Constitution and the lessons 
learnt from the jurisprudence analysed above. 
6.2 The ambit of SPLUMA 
The SPLUMA applies to the entire area of the Republic of South Africa. 381 
In addition, except as provided for in this Act, no legislation not repealed 
by this Act may prescribe an alternative or parallel mechanism, measure, 
institution or system on spatial planning, land use, land use management 
and land development in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of this 
379 Draft Regulations were published on 4 July 2014 for public comment in General Notice 526, Government Gazette 37797. 
380 The following Acts will be repealed: Removal of Restrictions Act (Act No. 84 of 1967); Physical Planning Act (Act No. 88 of 1967); Less 
Formal Township Establishment Act (Act No. 113 of 1991 ); Physical Planning Act (Act No. 125 of 1991 ); and Development Facilitation Act 
(Act No 67 of 1995). 
381 s 2(1). 
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Act. 382 The key words here are "except as provided for in the Act". 383 
SPLUMA provides that "Provincial legislation not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Act may provide for structures and procedures different 
from those provided for in this Act". 384 Schedule 1 lists matters that have 
to be regulated in provincial legislation and these include matters that are 
also regulated by SPLUMA. Accordingly, SPLUMA does not exhaustively 
regulate planning matters and is intended to be framework legislation. As 
a result, matters such as land use schemes, township establishment, 
subdivision of land, consolidation of land and the removal, suspension and 
amendment of conditions of title could potentially be regulated by 
provincial laws. However, all provincial legislation will have to be 
consistent with SPLUMA. 
6.3 Planning functions of the spheres of government 
The Act provides outlines the planning functions of each sphere of 
government. Municipal planning is said to include the following elements: 
the compilation, approval and review of lOPs; the compilation, approval 
and review of the components of an lOP prescribed by legislation and 
falling within the competence of a municipality, including a SOF and a land 
use scheme; and the control and regulation of the use of land within the 
municipal area where the nature, scale and intensity of the land use do not 
affect the provincial planning mandate of provincial government or the 
national interest. 385 
Provincial planning on the other hand involves: the compilation, approval 
and review of a provincial SOF; monitoring compliance by municipalities 
with this Act and provincial legislation in relation to the preparation, 
382S 2(2). 
383 Roos G "Will SPLUMA replace the 2008 PDA on 1 September 2014?: How to reconcile SPLUMA and the 2008 PDA" Kwalulu-Natal 
Planning and Development Act Internet Forum. 
384 s 10(2). 
385 s 5(1). 
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approval, review and implementation of land use management systems; 
the planning by a province for the efficient and sustainable execution of its 
legislative and executive powers insofar as they relate to the development 
of land and the change of land use; and the making and review of policies 
and laws necessary to implement provincial planning.386 
Lastly, National planning, in accordance with SPLUMA, consists of: the 
compilation, approval and review of spatial development plans and 
policies or similar instruments, including a national SDF; the planning by 
the national sphere for the efficient and sustainable execution of its 
legislative and executive powers insofar as they relate to the development 
of land and the change of land use; and the making and review of policies 
and laws necessary to implement national planning, including the 
measures designed to monitor and support other spheres in the 
performance of their spatial planning, land use management and land 
development functions. 387 
By describing the planning functions of each sphere of government, 
SPLUMA builds on lessons learned in judgements, such as the GOT case, 
and provides for legal certainty that will hopefully foster co-operative 
relations amongst the spheres of government operating in the planning 
space. 
6.4 Development principles, norms and standards 
The Act provides for a list of development principles388 that are applicable 
to all spheres of government and to all aspects of spatial planning, land 
development and land use management. 389 
386 s 5(2). 
387 s 5(3). 
388 See s 6(2) for the complete list of development principles; the principles, in summary, include: The principle of spatial justice; the principle 
of spatial sustainability; the principle of efficiency; the principle of spatial resilience; and the principle of good administration. 
38986(1). 
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The SPLUMA charges the Minister of Department of Rural Development 
and Land Reform (DRDLR), after consultation with provincial and local 
authorities, to develop norms and standards for land-use management 
and land development in accordance with certain guidelines set out in the 
Act. These include, but are not limited to, national policy, social inclusion 
and efficient and effective processes. Consequently, once these norms 
and standards are developed they could provide for a far more 
streamlined and holistic planning practice. 
6.5 Spatial planning 
The spatial planning system provide for by SPLUMA consists of SDFs to 
be developed by each sphere of government. The Act is prescriptive as to 
the contents of each SDF. The Act also states that in some case regional 
SDFs must also be developed. lOPs, adopted in terms of the Local 
Government Municipal Systems Act, will form the basis of municipal 
planning. lOPs must be consistent with provincial and national spatial 
frameworks. No land development decisions can be in conflict with a 
municipal SDF.390 In the event of conflict between a provincial and local 
government SDF, the Premier must in accordance with the IRFA take all 
necessary steps to support the revision in order to ensure consistency. 391 
The Act therefore provides greater certainty surrounding the confines and 
legal status of SDFs as well as the procedure to be followed in the event 
of conflict. 
390 s 22(1). 
391 s 22(3). 
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6.6 Intergovernmental support 
6.6.1 National government obligations 
SPLUMA bestows certain obligations on national government when it 
comes to the support of the other spheres of government. For example, 
national government must support and assist the other governmental 
spheres when it comes to fulfilling their respective land use management 
functions and related obligations.392 Moreover, national government must 
monitor:393 provincial and local government compliance with the 
development principles and norms and standards; local government 
progress with the adoption or amendment of land use schemes; the quality 
and effectiveness of municipal SDFs and other spatial planning and land 
use management tools and instruments; and the capacity of provincial and 
local government to implement the provision of the Act.394 National 
government must build the capacity of the other spheres through the 
development of support mechanisms in accordance with the Act and the 
IRFA.395 National government must, after consultation with provincial and 
local spheres of government, prescribe procedures to resolve and prevent 
conflicts or inconsistencies which may emerge from spatial plans, 
frameworks and policies of different spheres of government and between 
a spatial plan, framework and policies relating to land use of any other 
organ of state.396 In addition, the Act stipulates that national government 
must when performing a function, prescribed by the intergovernmental 
support provisions of the Act, consult with any Minister responsible for a 
national function affected by the performance of that function. 397 
392 8 9(1)(a). 
393 8 9(1)(b). 





6.6.2 Provincial government obligations 
The SPLUMA also stipulates that provincial government may, subject to 
the Constitution and any other law regulating provincial supervision and 
monitoring of municipalities in the province, support and assist local 
government. This includes assisting with the preparation, adoption or 
revision land use schemes and the alignment of land use management 
systems.398 
Moreover, provincial government may in terms of SPLUMA take steps to 
resolve disputes in connection with the preparation, adoption or revision of 
a SDFs, land use schemes or related tools and planning instruments.399 
Notably the Act states that this must take place "subject to the Constitution 
and any other law regulating provincial supervision and monitoring of 
municipalities in the province.400 
Importantly, SPLUMA makes it mandatory for provincial government to 
develop mechanisms to support, monitor and strengthen the capacity of 
municipalities to adopt and implement an effective system of land use 
management in accordance with this Act.401 Similarly, provincial 
legislation having the effect of regulating land use, land use management 
and land development within a province must promote the development of 
local government capacity to enable municipalities to perform their 
municipal planning functions.402 
398 s 10(3). 
399 S 10(3)(c). 
400 S 1 0(3)(c). 
401 s 10(4). 
402 s 10(5). 
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6.6.3 Municipal differentiation 
The above provision for support, monitoring, capacity building and conflict 
resolution of the spheres of government is positive to see and is in line 
with the mandate placed on government in terms of Section 155 of the 
Constitution. However, in light of the jurisprudence analysed above, it is 
important that national and provincial government do not intrude 
unnecessarily into the realm of municipal planning. As a result, SPLUMA 
provides that before such support takes place the respective sphere needs 
to consider the unique circumstances of the relevant municipality.403 The 
Act stipulates that the specific circumstances that need to be taken into 
account include: the category of the municipality; the criteria identified and 
applied in accordance with national or provincial legislation relating to the 
supervision and monitoring of local government; financial resources, 
capacity and financial viability of a municipality.404 
6. 7 Land use management 
A municipality must, after public consultation, adopt and approve a single 
land use scheme for its entire area within five years from the 
commencement of this Act. 405 The land use scheme will have force of law 
and will be binding on all organs of state, land owners and land users 
within the municipal area.406 The land use schemes adopted in terms of 
SPLUMA will replaces all existing schemes within the municipal area to 
which the land use scheme applies and will provide for land use and 
development rights within the area covered.407 
403 s 11(1). 
404 s 11(2). 
405 s 24(1 ). 
406 S 26(1 )(a). 
407 S 26(1}(b}-(c). 
102 
Land use schemes must: include appropriate categories of land use 
zoning and regulations for the entire municipal area, including areas not 
previously subject to a land use scheme; take cognisance of relevant 
environmental management instruments adopted by environmental 
authorities (i.e. Bioregional Plans and Environmental Management 
Frameworks ); comply with all relevant environmental legislation; provide 
for incremental regulation of informal settlements and areas not previously 
subject to a land use scheme; include incentives to promote the effective 
implementation of the SDF; include provisions that promote the policies of 
national and provincial government; and give effect to municipal SDFs and 
IDPS.408 In addition, land use schemes must include zoning maps, zoning 
regulations that we have at present and a register of all amendments to 
such land use scheme.409 
Local government may pass by-laws aimed at enforcing its land use 
scheme.410 However, given the ambit of the proposed land use schemes 
and the potential need to develop by-laws there were concerns that local 
government would have the capacities and expertise to meet the five year 
deadline. In order to address this, the Western Cape Government, for 
example, took on the task of drafting a model by-law on municipal 
planning as well as a Model Zoning Scheme, to be considered for 
adoption as by-laws by municipalities. 
Importantly SPLUMA also provides for potential integration by stipulating 
that where an activity requiring authorisation in terms of this Act is also 
regulated in terms of another law, the relevant municipality and the other 
organ of state can issue separate authorisations or an integrated 
authorisation.411 
408 s 24(2). 
409 s 25(2). 
410 s 32(1). 
411 s 30(1). 
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6.8 Land development 
6.8.1 Municipal planning tribunal as the appeal authorities 
The SPLUMA makes it clear that local government is the authority of first 
instance in regard to land development applications.412 SPLUMA provides 
that municipalities need to form Municipal Planning Tribunals who will act 
as the primary decision making authorities. 
The Municipal Planning Tribunals must consist of officials in the full-time 
employ of the municipality and persons appointed by the municipal council 
who or not municipal officials.413 Municipal councillors may not be 
appointed as members of a Municipal Planning Tribunal.414 
A person whose rights are affected by a decision taken by a Municipal 
Planning Tribunal may appeal against that decision by giving written notice 
of the appeal and reasons to the municipal manager415 who must submit 
the appeal to the executive authority of the municipalitl16 as the appeal 
authority.417 The municipal executive authority has the power to confirm, 
vary or revoke the decision.418 It has been stated that the "municipality's 
ability to appeal to its own executive authority is, at face value, a 
somewhat ludicrous notion."419 However, the Act does allow a municipality 
to authorise that a body or institution outside of the municipality assume 
412 s 33(1). 
413 s 36(1). 
414 s 36(2). 
415 s 51(1). 
41 6 Previous drafts of the Act made provision for appeal to a provincial planning tribunal; however, this would have unconstitutional in 
accordance with the Habitat Council judgement. 
417 s 51(2). 
418 S51(3) 
41 9 Garlicke and Bousfield Planning Legislation Gets a Makeover. 
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the obligations of an appeal authority.420 Therefore the Act does provide 
for delegation of powers regarding appeals. 
A question that arises is whether the potential composition of the 
Municipal Planning Tribunals and the fact that delegation of powers can 
take place is not akin to the DFA tribunal setup declared unconstitutional 
in the GDT (CC) judgement? After all, Section 156(1 )(a) of the Constitution 
states that a Municipality has executive authority in respect of, and has 
the right to administer ... municipal planning". However, the difference here 
is that it is the municipality that appoints the tribunal or delegates the 
appeal functions to another body not provincial or national government. 
Provincial and national government can provide for regulation of municipal 
planning but they cannot impede on those functions bestowed on 
municipalities. 
6.8.2 Provincial legislative appeal process for local government 
It is important to reiterate that SPLUMA does allow provincial government 
to draft legislation that may provide for alternative measures to those 
stipulated in SPLUMA, as long as such measures are consistent with 
SPLUMA and the IGRFA.421 Therefore province can provide for its own 
appeal and review procedures which may be followed by local 
government.422 It is important that the Habitat Council judgement is kept in 
mind by provincial government when drafting their respective provincial 
planning laws and if providing for different appeal procedures.423 As a 
recap, this Davis J ruled that an MEC can be involved in the appeal 
420 s 51(6). 
421 s 10(1). 
422 See Schedule 1 for a list of matters that may be addressed by provincial legislation. 
423 The Western Cape Department of Environmental Affairs and Development Planning (DEADP) have provided on its website a list of 
frequently asked questions (FAQ) around the Habitat Council Judgement (website details are provided in the bibliography below). 
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process but they will have to assess such appeals within the context of the 
provincial monitoring and support functions as contained in the 
Constitution. Therefore in context of LUPO there are three ways (or a 
combination thereof) that the MEC will be able to decide appeals. First, the 
MEC may, after consultation with the municipal council, dismiss an appeal 
against the decision of a council.424 In such a case the MEC in effect 
agrees with the council and therefore dismissed the appeal. Second, 
section 44(3)(a) of LUPO, as amended, permits the MEC, in instances 
where the MEC is of the opinion that a municipality did not effectively 
perform its functions in respect of a municipal planning matter, to set aside 
this decision or part of a decision, thereby referring it back to the council, 
requiring it to reconsider the matter.425 The MEC will provide reasons for 
this decision, and these reasons will form part of the reconsideration of the 
matter by the municipality.426 Last, section 44(3)(b) of LUPO, as amended, 
permits the MEC to substitute his decision for that of the municipality only 
in instances where the MEC is of the opinion that the application also 
concerns provincial planning considerations and that the MEC has made 
an incorrect decision on these aspects.427 
6.8.3 Land development applications that affect national interests 
SPLUMA also provides certainty regarding land development applications 
made to municipalities that may impact upon national government 
interests. Section 52 states that development applications that may affect 
national interest and therefore should be referred to the Minister. These 
include applications that may materially impact upon: matters within the 
exclusive functional area of the national sphere in terms of the 
Constitution; strategic national policy objectives, principles or priorities, 
including food security, international relations and co-operation, defence 
424 See the DEADP website for FAQs on the Habitat Council Judgement (website details are provided in the bibliography below). 
425 See the DEADP website for FAQs on the Habitat Council Judgement (website details are provided in the bibliography below). 
426 See the DEADP website for FAQs on the Habitat Council Judgement (website details are provided in the bibliography below). 
427 See the DEADP website for FAQs on the Habitat Council Judgement (website details are provided in the bibliography below). 
and economic unity; or land use for a purpose which falls within the 
functional area of the national sphere of government.428 
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In addition, land development applications must be referred to the minister 
if the outcome may affect national interests.429 The Act provides scenarios 
where an application may impact national interests.430 These include: 
applications where the outcome may be prejudicial to the economic, health 
or security interests of one or more provinces or the Republic as a whole; 
and applications that may impede the effective performance of the 
functions by one or more municipalities or provinces relating to matters 
within their functional area of legislative competence.431 
The Act states that where an applicant believes that the application is 
likely to affect the national interest, they must submit a copy of that 
application to the Minister.432 In addition, if a Municipal Planning Tribunal 
receives such an application they must provide the national Minister with a 
copy thereof.433 The Minister upon receiving the copy of the application 
may join as a party in such application or may direct that such application 
be referred to him or her to decide.434 Importantly the Act expressly 
reiterates that nothing in this section authorises the lodgement or referral 
of an application for land use or land development to the Minister without 
such application having first been lodged and considered by the relevant 
municipality.435 Therefore the municipality remains the authority of first 
instance. 
428 s 52(1). 
429 s 52(2). 
430 s 52(6). 
431 s 52(2). 
432 s 52(3). 
433 s 52(1)-(5). 
434 s 52(5). 
435 s 52(7). 
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In addition, the Act charges national government with the obligation to 
prescribe a set of criteria to guide the implementation of this section.436 
This will aid development applicants and municipalities to determine when 
a copy of the application needs to be submitted to the Minister. 
6.9 Conclusion 
SPLUMA has set out a comprehensive framework governing spatial 
planning, land use management and land development management. Its 
provision relating to planning mandates and intergovernmental support 
have provided for legal certainty in line with recent jurisprudence and the 
Constitutional mandates bestowed on each sphere. Also SPLUMA will 
apply to the whole of South Africa and will repeal a host of laws that 
previously provided for a cumbersome and fragmented planning regime. 
Nevertheless, SPLUMA has bestowed obligations on each sphere of 
government that may present challenges especially at a local level. 
SPLUMA has in accordance with the Constitution, and in line with 
judgements such as the Lagoon Bay and GOT cases, placed local 
government at the coalface of planning. Municipalities are therefore 
confirmed as the principle sphere of government responsible for planning 
and they therefore carry the main obligations when it comes to the 
implementation of the Act. This involves, amongst other matters, the 
establishment of Municipal Planning Tribunals, comprehensive land use 
schemes and by-laws. It is therefore essential that national and provincial 
government provide the support needed to local government to allow them 
to implement an effective planning regime within their respective 
jurisdictions. 
436 s 53(6). 
.. 
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National government initiatives have been headed up by the Department 
of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) that is "coordinating and 
driving a change management process through an Implementation and 
Change Management Plan to assist provinces and municipalities in 
considering and drafting spatial planning and land-use management 
legislation (at provincial level) and land use schemes and by-laws (at 
municipallevel)."437 In addition some provinces (for example, Gauteng, 
Kwa-Zulu Natal and the Western Cape) have taken a pro-active approach 
in their own planning and budgeting considerations, making provision for 
the Act to come into operation.438 In addition, the Western Cape is in the 
process of promulgating its own planning legislation which, inter alia, that 
will align with and give effect to SPLUMA.439 
437 Kruger Planning with purpose. 
438 Kruger Planning with purpose. 
439 Kruger Planning with purpose. 
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7 Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This thesis has outlined the pre-1994 dispensation and the type of 
government that was based on "the old traditional stratified three-tier 
system". The planning powers of this era rested on the four provinces, the 
former TBVC independent homelands and the self-governing territories. 
However, it was explained how this system of having numerous parallel 
planning authorities only further fragmentation the planning regime. In 
addition, the use of planning laws during the apartheid era to promote a 
segregated and unequal landscape gravely undermined the legitimacy of 
planning as a discipline. 
Thereafter, planning in the post-constitutional era was discussed and the 
new "sphered system" of government was outlined. It was discussed how 
the Constitution has placed certain legislative and administrative functions on 
the respective spheres of government. However, it was also explained how 
the Constitution allows for overlap of such function in given circumstances 
and how this together with the lack of definitions within the constitution for 
"municipal planning", "provincial planning", "urban and rural development" 
and "regional planning and development" has resulted in confusion. 
In addition, it was explained how the regulatory framework consists of a 
plethora of planning legislation and planning tools that do not always speak 
the same language. A number of factors were outlined that amount in a 
completely discombobulating framework within which the land-use planning 
authorities are expected to operate. 
Given the above confusion, it was discussed why the plethora of co-operative 
governance legislative and non-legislative attempts have failed to provide the 
safety net envisaged and that ultimately this failure has resulted in a range of 
matters going to court. 
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A number of court decision were discussed and it was concluded that the 
courts had contributed to providing some legal certainty on a number of 
matters such as: unravelling of the "municipal planning"; the relationship 
between the MPRDA and LUPO; the confines of "provincial planning", 
"regional planning and development" and "urban and rural development"; the 
allowance for parallel statutory bestowed with "municipal planning" function; 
the conflicts between environmental mandates and planning mandates; local 
government's ability to legislate on environmental matters; the application of 
provincial planning tools; provincial governments ability to decide extra 
municipal issues etc. However, it was also stated that there are some 
matters that could still be further clarified. 
Lastly, the SPLUMA was outlined and it was discussed how it will fill many of 
the gaps left by judiciary and created for by the previous planning regime. 
Nevertheless, the implementation of the Act will not be without its challenges 
and therefore it was held that the spheres of government need to support 
one another to make the implementation of the Act a success. 
As a final comment, developments over the last five years have provided a 
planning regime indistinguishable from that inherited by from the pre-1994 
dispensation. This new planning regime is bolstered by the fact that there is 
finally a national planning law to guide the future development of planning in 
South Africa. In addition, the efforts of the courts will go a long way in 
making the relationships between planning authorities a far more cohesive 
one. The framework is in place for a more cohesive planning law system in 
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